















The Thesis Committee for Aleksej Demjanski 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Thesis: 
 
 
Framing the News:  

















Lorinc Redei, Co-Supervisor 
 
  
Framing the News:  








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Arts 
and 
Master of Global Policy Studies 
 
 




I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my thesis supervisors – Dr. Mary 
Neuburger at the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies and Dr. Lorinc 
Redei at the LBJ School of Public Affairs – for their guidance and advice throughout the 
research and writing process. The passion, dedication, and wisdom you have both imparted 
on me over the past few years is something I will always remember.  
I would also like to give special thanks to the faculty and staff at the Center for 
Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies for their unrelenting support. Without your 
help I would never have received funding to study Albanian in the U.S. and Albania, had 
the honor to receive a Fulbright fellowship to do research in Romania and Bulgaria, and 
been selected for a Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship to study 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. Agnes Sekowski, Roy Flores, Tamara Kowalski, Jenica Jones, 
Rebekah Sherman-Loeffler, Aaron Jupe, Cara Keirstead, Nhi Nguyen, and many others – 
I am forever grateful for your kindness. The support you give to students year after year 
deserves more recognition. 
Finally, to my loving parents and dear friends – thank you for always standing by 
me. To my mom and dad – без вас ништо од ова не би било можно. I love you both. To 
my friends – thank you for listening to me complain and encouraging me to keep going. 
Ellery Cushman and Tracy Heim – I could not have done it without both of you! On to new 







Framing the News:  
Deutsche Welle, Sputnik News, and Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution 
 
Aleksej Demjanski, M.A.; M.G.P.S. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 
 
Supervisor: Mary Neuburger, Co-Supervisor: Lorinc Redei 
 
State-owned international broadcasters have since World War II been a 
fundamental part of a country’s public diplomacy and broader foreign policy efforts. These 
broadcasters not only serve to present a country’s position to the world, but actively frame 
the way unfolding current events are seen by the public. Despite the dominance of social 
media today – international broadcasters have in the past decade seen an expansion in their 
audience reach as well as an increase in their funding. This research examines how 
Germany’s Deutsche Welle (DW) and Russia’s Sputnik News (SN) framed the 2016 pro-
democracy protests in Macedonia that came to known as the “Colorful Revolution.” While 
it is no surprise that this research found both DW and SN framed the Macedonian protests 
in line with their respective government’s policies – how they framed them differed. The 
use of particular framing devices (subtle and direct), the repetition of certain topics and the 
omission of others, as well as the intertextual links to prior news texts showcase the specific 
methods by which Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News framed the Colorful Revolution. This 
research found that DW utilized (1) a domestic crisis frame in English-language reporting, 
(2) a divided country frame in Macedonian-language reporting, and (3) a rule of law frame 
in both English and Macedonian. SN, on the other hand, utilized (1) a foreign meddling 
frame, (2) an ethnic conflict and regional destabilization frame, and (3) a law and order 
frame in both English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. Deutsche Welle’s frames were 
targeted based on the perceived audience – an English speaking and international audience 
as well as a local Macedonian speaking audience. On the other hand, Sputnik News utilized 
both international and locally salient discourses in both its English and 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language editions. Further research is needed that explores the 
news production of frames as well as the framing effects in order to holistically understand 
what role Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News play in framing international events. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The twenty-first century has seen the spread of two coalescing phenomena – the 
rise of information and communication technologies (ICT) and the globalization of protest. 
As we have entered the “information age” the role of the media and the competition over 
information has garnered greater attention among academics and policymakers alike. 
Similarly, as causes such as democracy, the fight against inequality, and human rights have 
gained traction so too have protest movements seeking to address them. The intersection 
of these different phenomena – largely focused on social media platforms and their use by 
both protesters and governments – has seen an explosion in scholarly research. However, 
much less academic inquiry has been afforded to the role of state-owned international 
broadcasters – institutions which came of age in the twentieth century during World War 
II and endured throughout the Cold War – and how they have adapted to this new 
information age. This research seeks to fill that gap by exploring how two state-owned 
international broadcasters – Germany’s Deutsche Welle (DW) and Russia’s Sputnik News 
(SN) – reported on the 2016 pro-democracy protests in Macedonia which came to be 
known as the “Colorful Revolution.” 
In particular, this research asks: how did Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News frame 
Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution and what narratives did they promote in their online 
coverage of the protests? Furthermore, this work compares the frames present in each 
broadcaster’s reporting with the official statements (such as press releases, interviews, 
speeches, etc.) of the German and Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their 
respective embassies in Skopje. While both broadcasters frame the protests in Macedonia 
in line with their respective government – they do so differently. Deutsche Welle eschews 
the use of opinion pieces and commentaries whereas Sputnik News embraces them in 
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furthering certain frames. Both cover the protests themselves, but while DW focuses on 
what initiated them, SN skips over these details and focuses on arguing that the protests 
are tearing apart Macedonia’s legal order. Deutsche Welle remains strict in its framing by 
targeting its discourse depending on whether an article is written in English and aimed at 
an international audience or if it is in Macedonian and honed in on local issues. Sputnik 
News, on the other hand, blends locally salient discourses into its framing in English 
despite the lack of relevance to an international audience.  
 The remainder of this thesis will be presented as follows. First, a methodological 
section will review concepts such as critical discourse analysis, various aspects framing 
theory, and the notion of intertextuality. This will be followed by a case selection section 
which presents why Deutsche Welle, Sputnik News, and the events surrounding 
Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution were selected for analysis. The section will also describe 
how the state-owned international broadcasters see themselves and what scholars have 
written about their activities. The next section, a brief literature review, will review 
scholarly work on the media, public diplomacy and international broadcasting, as well as 
work written on the intersection of the news media and protests. Following the literature 
review the thesis will provide a brief background section looking at German and Russian 
interests in Macedonia as well as the events leading to the Colorful Revolution. The thesis 
will then go into an analysis section and unpack the news frames in DW’s English-language 
reporting, DW’s Macedonian-language reporting, DW’s opinion pieces in both languages, 
and then compare the frames in DW’s reporting with statements made by German 
government officials regarding the protest in Macedonia. The analysis section will move 
on to look at the frames in both Sputnik News’ English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian 
(BCS) language reporting, discuss the opinion pieces in SN’s reporting, and finally 
compare the frames with statements from Russian government officials. Following the 
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analysis, the thesis will make a comparative analysis between the news frames of both DW 
and SN in their coverage of the Colorful Revolution. The thesis will then end with a 
conclusion as well as discuss the relevance of this work to policymakers and areas for 




To accomplish the goals of this research, this study will employ the concept of 
framing from media and communication studies as well as utilize a content analysis and 
critical discourse analysis of Deutsche Welle and Spunk News’ online news stories. The 
stories will be reviewed to unpack the news frames manifest in the reporting on 
Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution. These news stories feature regular news texts of current 
events, videos, podcasts, as well as opinion pieces and commentary by guest authors or 
members of the news staff. A qualitative analysis of the news texts, detailing the frames 
utilized by DW and SN, will be accompanied by a review of their opinion pieces and a 
comparison of the news frames with statements from German and Russian officials 
regarding the protests in Macedonia. 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
As noted, this research will rely on critical discourse analysis – as well content and 
discourse analyses – to explore the news texts produced by Deutsche Welle and Sputnik 
News regarding Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution. As James Watson notes, discourse 
analysis emphasizes how news media, through “linguistic patterns, word and phrase 
selection (lexical choices), grammatical constructions and story coherence” present the 
world to consumers of news.1 Content analysis, on the other hand, is more comparative in 
nature exploring discursive similarities and differences across news texts, multiple news 
outlets, and across a number of countries. However, unlike discourse analysis which 
focuses on analyzing the semiotics within a text – critical discourse analysis strives to go 
 
1 James Watson, Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies, Ninth edition (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015), 82. 
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beyond the linguistics and understand the social and political implications intertwined with 
the written word.  
As Norman Fairclough has argued, critical discourse analysis intentionally 
examines not only the news texts, but “(a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) 
wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes;” in order to make sense of 
“how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations 
of power and struggles over power.”2 As such, the notion of discourse is not merely text or 
speech, but something which has agency itself. As communications and media scholar 
Teun A. van Dijk has described:  
Discourse is no longer just an ‘intervening variable’ between media institutions or 
journalists on the one hand, and the audience on the other hand, but also studies in 
its own right, and as a central and manifest cultural and social product in and 
through which meanings and ideologies are expressed or (re-) produced...3 
These sorts of critical discourse analyses have become standard practice in 
sociology, linguistic anthropology, and more recently in media and communication studies 
and political science. Having this in mind, to analyze media discourse, Anabela Carvalho 
has suggested a broad framework that incorporates both textual and contextual analysis. 
Textual analysis examines (1) layout and structural organization, (2) objects, (3) actors, (4) 
languages, grammar and rhetoric, (5) discursive strategies, and (6) ideological standpoints 
while contextual analysis incorporates (1) comparative-synchronic analysis and (2) 
historical-diachronic analysis.4 Such a comprehensive method of analyzing both the news 
 
2 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, Language in Social 
Life Series (London ; Longman, 1995), 132. 
3 Teun A. Van Dijk, Discourse and Communication: New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media 
Discourse and Communication, vol. 10 (Berlin, New York: DE GRUYTER, 1985), 5. 
4 Anabela Carvalho, “Media(Ted) Discourse and Society,” Journalism Studies 9, no. 2 (April 2008): 167–
72. 
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text as well as the broader context within which it is produced is necessary to understand 
how news media frame events. 
FRAMING 
A related concept (and form of analysis) which has gained traction in media and 
communication studies is that of “framing.” Erving Goffman, in his 1974 sociological work 
Framing Analysis, originally contributed to the notion of a frame describing it as a 
“schemata of interpretation” used to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” various aspects 
of everyday life.5 As the concept of a frame transitioned from sociology into the media and 
communications studies field it garnered new meaning. Todd Gitlin, in his seminal work 
from 1980, emphasized frames as “… principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation 
composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters.”6 
Similarly, William Gamson and Andre Modigliani describe a frame as “a central 
organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events.”7 More 
recently, Stephen Reese argued that frames can be seen “as structures that draw boundaries, 
set up categories, define some ideas as out and others in, and generally operate to snag 
related ideas in their net in an active process.”8 Due to the interdisciplinary nature of 
framing, and frames themselves, a plethora of definitions have emerged.  
However, Robert M. Entman’s conceptualization of framing is among the most 
detailed and prominently cited. Entman offers a more operationalizable definition of 
 
5 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1974), 21. 
6 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 6. 
7 William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action,” Research in 
Political Sociology 3 (1987): 137–177. 
8 Stephen D. Reese, “The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited,” Journal of 
Communication 57, no. 1 (March 2007): 150. 
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framing which makes it most applicable to the goals of this research. As Entman describes: 
“Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of 
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text...”9 As such, 
according to Entman, frames do the following:  
…(1) define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and 
benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; (2) diagnose causes 
– identify the forces creating the problem; (3) make moral judgments – evaluate 
causal agents and their effects; and (4) suggest remedies – offer and justify 
treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.  
In order to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements, and suggest 
remedies – the frames themselves are “…manifested by the presence or absence of certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that 
provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments…” Other scholars, such as 
Gamson and Modigliani, have referred to these as “framing devices” and can include “(1) 
metaphors, (2) exemplars (i.e., historical examples from which lessons are drawn), (3) 
catchphrases, (4) depictions, and (5) visual images (e.g., icons).”10 The variety of these 
devices and their subtle (or intentional) incorporation into a news text is what makes critical 
discourse analysis so important in explaining the subtleties present within a text. 
As an overall field, framing research in media and communications studies has been 
divided into three major categories. Research that examines news production and the 
creation of frames (by journalists, political actors, and others – often referred to as “frame 
sponsors”), the frames themselves as they exist in news texts, and finally how the frames 
are received by an audience and their subsequent cognitive impacts (i.e. “framing effects”). 
This research is primarily focused with analyzing the news frames themselves as they are 
 
9 Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 
43, no. 4 (1993): 52–53. 
10 William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A 
Constructionist Approach,” American Journal of Sociology 95, no. 1 (1989): 1–37. 
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utilized in the news texts published by Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News. While this study 
is not interested in either the specifics of the production of the news frames nor does it seek 
to analyze the public reception and cognitive effects of those frames – it is important to 
note the role of the frame sponsor and how that relates to ideas about public diplomacy and 
international broadcasting which will be discussed in the literature review. 
FRAME SPONSORS 
Research by Herbert Gans, Gale Tuchman, and other scholars studying news 
production and news construction discuss how news frames are often created 
unconsciously by journalists seeking to present current events to the broader public.11 In 
this line of research, there is consensus that journalists, editors, or even news organizations 
themselves create frames, whether as a “mental model” to simplify the news to readers or 
for other reasons, and thus serve as frame sponsors. Aside from this internal framing, i.e. 
that emerging from within the news organization itself, there may also be an outside factor 
influencing how journalists report the news. The assumption is that rather than those 
crafting the news text (journalists and editors) – someone else – an elected official, business 
corporation, or other party with a vested interest, influences the process in order to frame 
the news event in a particular manner. Baldwin Van Gorp notes that, with  
… news conferences or government statements, certain sponsors of a particular 
frame… may strategically try to convince the media to cover a situation in 
accordance with ‘their’ frame, that is, by prior strategic decision making regarding 
the manner in which they will announce their viewpoints.12 
 
11 Gale Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press, 1978); 
Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, 
and Time, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1980); Peter Golding, Making the News, 1st 
ed. (London ; Longman, 1979);  W. Russell Neuman, Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of 
Political Meaning., American Politics and Political Economy Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992). 
12 Baldwin Van Gorp, “The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In,” Journal of 
Communication 57, no. 1 (March 2007): 68. 
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As such, there are no frameless news stories, but rather questions as to who gets to 
decide the news frame and for what reasons. This notion of frame sponsors is important in 
the case of international broadcasters such as Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News because 
while these institutions formally adhere to journalistic standards and ethics, they are 
nonetheless state sponsored. As such, intentionally or not these broadcasters have an 
agenda with which they are tasked. DW and SN, unlike private media organizations, not 
only report the news but play an active part in their respective country’s public diplomacy 
efforts. In other words, they have a specific role within the broader news media 
environment that has been delegated to them by the relevant authorities. Ultimately, as Van 
Gorp contends, “press releases provided by frame sponsors and whose purpose is to 
convince the receiver as much as to inform them, the choice of frame is quite deliberate.”13 
As such, the news frames in Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News’ reporting are not just 
unconscious efforts to present a certain reality, but conscious attempts to create a reality in 
line with the foreign policy objectives of their respective state. 
INTERTEXTUALITY 
Finally, it is also important to bring in the concept of intertextuality. Emerging in 
the fields of sociology and linguistic anthropology, Mikhail Bakhtin initially described the 
concept as heteroglossia, noting that language: 
… represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the 
present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-
ideological groups in the present… These ‘languages’ of heteroglossia intersect 
each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying ‘languages.’14  
 
13 Ibid 
14 Mikhail M. Bakhtin and Michael Holquist, Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1981), 291. 
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The notion as described by Bakhtin is that language is not only a social construct 
but tied to previous uses of language. Norman Fairclough has applied this 
conceptualization of language to text and argues that intertextuality is “the property texts 
have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged 
in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth.”15 Thus, 
news texts can similarly be seen as products which “echo” previous news texts as well as 
the broader historical and sociopolitical reality in which they are formed. Certain notions, 
catchphrases, images, syntax, and other framing devices within one news text may relate 
to those same or similar framing devices used in a prior news text in turn creating a 
conscious or unconscious chain between the texts. 
As Robert Entman and his colleagues have noted, “a framing message has particular 
cultural resonance; it calls to mind currently congruent elements of schemas that were 
stored in the past...”16 This connection across multiple texts and over time lies at the crux 
of intertextuality. These intertextual connections between news texts are important in 
analyzing some of the semiotics and references present in Deutsche Welle and Sputnik 
News’ reporting of the Colorful Revolution in Macedonia. In particular, both DW and SN 
frame the Colorful Revolution while utilizing discourses, metaphors, and descriptions 
informed by prior protests and their sociopolitical context; that is, they intertextually 
appropriate the reporting and narratives from the past (in both English, but also local 
languages) to frame the present. 
As Christian Baden summarizes, “[n]ews texts contain references to events, issues, 
actors, and considerations from prior news and use framing devices and identity chains in 
 
15 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge, Mass: Polity Press, 1992), 84. 
16 Robert M. Entman, Jörg Matthes, and Lynn Pellicano, “Nature, Sources, and Effects of News Framing,” 
in The Handbook of Journalism Studies (New York, United States: Taylor & Francis Group, 2008), 177. 
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order to mark and retrieve additional information required for the frame.”17 This gives 
frames a certain potency in their implementation as they tap into recent histories, memories, 
and emotions. As such, it will be crucial to review recent Macedonian history leading to 
the Colorful Revolution as well as German and Russian interests in Macedonia, in order to 
make sense of the news texts produced by Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News. Before doing 
that, it is important to note why these two broadcasters and the 2016 pro-democracy 
protests in Macedonia were selected for analysis.  
  
 
17 Christian Baden, “Reconstructing Frames from Intertextual News Discourse: A Semantic Network 
Approach to News Framing Analysis,” in Doing News Framing Analysis II (Routledge, 2018), 3–15. 
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Case Selection 
The reasons for selecting these two international broadcasters and examining their 
reporting of Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution are numerous. First, both international 
broadcasters – Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News – offer an English-language edition as 
well as local language editions (Macedonian and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian). This means 
that the broadcaster, in reporting on current events, targets both an international English-
speaking audience as well as a local language speaking audience in Macedonia and the 
broader Balkan region. This allows the study to explore differences between the reporting 
in the different languages. In fact, Sputnik News utilizes the same news frames in both 
English and BCS whereas Deutsche Welle has different news frames in English than it 
does in Macedonian (although with some overlap). 
Second, in the past ten years, both Germany (as a major player in the European 
Union) and Russia have increased their political and economic activities in Macedonia and 
across the Balkans. As such their foreign policies, an aspect of which is public diplomacy 
and the work of their international broadcasters, are vested in the region. The United States 
played an active role in the region, particularly during the wars in the 1990s, but has since 
become less involved and passed the mantle of upholding regional peace and stability in 
the Balkans to the European Union.18 American international broadcasters such as Voice 
of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty were potential sources of analysis for 
this study. However, Voice of America’s mission is more focused on presenting America 
and the American’s perspective to the world much like how Russia’s RT network is 
focused on presenting Russia to the world.19 Furthermore, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
 
18 Jasmin Mujanovic, “The Euro-Atlantic Project Is Ending in the Balkans,” Balkan Insight, December 13, 
2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/12/13/the-euro-atlantic-project-is-ending-in-the-balkans-12-13-2016/. 
19 Alan L. Heil, Voice of America: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
 13 
Liberty and their reporters on the ground in Macedonia and elsewhere in the former 
Yugoslavia were set up to serve as surrogate news outlets during the 1990s and early 2000s 
when independent media in the region struggled to survive.20 Thus, their mission and 
structure as news organizations is different than that of Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News. 
As such, this research decided to exclude these two American broadcasters from analysis. 
Other states, such as Turkey and Qatar, have also set up regionally focused 
international broadcasting networks in the Balkans. Turkey’s Anadolu Agency provides 
coverage in English, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, and Macedonian.21 However, their 
reporting on Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution was sparse and as such excluded from 
analysis. Similarly, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network, known for its extensive coverage of world 
affairs in English also set up a regional television network based in Sarajevo – known as 
Al Jazeera Balkans – that operates in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian.22 However, the reporting 
of the English-language edition of Al Jazeera was, like that of Turkey’s Anadolu, rather 
limited and thus did not provide enough content for a proper comparative analysis. It is 
worth noting this lack of coverage by Anadolu Agency and Al Jazeera as it may be an 
indicator of the relative level of interest these two countries have in engaging in 
international broadcasting efforts in the Balkans. This is, however, beyond the scope of 
this research. 
Third, Macedonia’s 2016 protests garnered international attention with reporting in 
major news outlets such as the BBC, CNN, Washington Post, and the New York Times. 
 
20 Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York, 
NY : Praeger, 1983); Nicholas John Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: 
American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
21 “History,” Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/p/history. 
22 “O nama [About us],” Al Jazeera Balkans, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/o-nama; “Al Jazeera Starts 
Balkans Channel,” BBC News, November 11, 2011, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
15701549. 
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As such, the protests were portrayed in international reporting from a geopolitical lens. In 
particular, the Colorful Revolution protests for many international observers were a turning 
point in whether Macedonia would continue to slide away from its Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations and look east toward Russia or whether the country would return on a more 
democratic path toward integration into the European Union. Thus, the way in which both 
international broadcasters, Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News, reported on the situation 
was influenced by this geopolitical discourse emerging from the broader international 
media environment. Finally, it is important to note that Deutsche Welle is an established 
international broadcaster that has been around for decades. Sputnik News, on the other 
hand, formed out of the remnants of Russia and the Soviet Union’s former international 
broadcasting efforts has not existed for even a decade. To better understand the distinctions 
between the two broadcasters it is important to take a deeper dive into their structures and 
missions. 
DEUTSCHE WELLE 
According to Deutsche Welle’s website, they are “Germany’s international 
broadcaster and one of the most successful and relevant international media outlets” with 
reporting in more than 30 languages that attracts hundreds of millions of viewers. Founded 
in 1953, DW is formally “a non-profit, public broadcasting institution for foreign 
broadcasting” which is federally financed through German taxpayers. As Anke Fiedler and 
Marie-Soleil Frère note in their research on the international broadcaster, with the 
“Deutsche Welle-Act, passed by the German Bundestag in the autumn of 2004, DW… has 
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the ‘legal capacity and the right to be self-governing.’”23 Oliver Zöllner elaborates on this 
legal framework in his own research, arguing that: 
DW is designed to remain editorially independent; a status which is ensured by an 
elaborate system of regular parliamentary accords. The broadcaster is therefore not 
institutionalized as a government agency (VOA type) but as an autonomous public 
corporation (BBC model), which of course implies a well-established practice of 
autonomy limited by and within the overlapping societal subsystems of media and 
politics.24 
Thus, in comparison with other international broadcasters receiving state funding, 
Deutsche Welle is considered among the premier institutions to have established not only 
formal editorial independence, but also relative institutional independence. within the 
German state apparatus. Thus, DW has proactively attempted to eschew any perceptions 
that it is a direct mouthpiece of the German government. Regardless, the goals of DW as a 
media organization (as defined in the Deutsche Welle Act) and those of Germany’s foreign 
policy often coalesce and work in tandem considering that DW is ultimately part of 
Germany’s public diplomacy efforts.  
Deutsche Welle’s website openly states that their “aim is to foster a peaceful, stable 
global community” by focusing on issues including “freedom and human rights, 
democracy and good governance, free trade and social justice, health education and 
environmental protection, technology and innovation.”25 DW notes that their broadcasts 
are targeted “…to young people, to opinion leaders, to those actively involved in public 
debate, and to everyone striving to understand what is happening in the world…”26 As the 
analysis section of this research will show – these goals manifest themselves in the news 
 
23 Anke Fiedler and Marie-Soleil Frère, “‘Radio France Internationale’ and ‘Deutsche Welle’ in 
Francophone Africa: International Broadcasters in a Time of Change,” Communication, Culture & Critique 
9, no. 1 (2016): 80. 
24 Oliver Zöllner, “A Quest for Dialogue in International Broadcasting: Germany’s Public Diplomacy 
Targeting Arab Audiences,” Global Media and Communication 2, no. 2 (August 1, 2006): 170. 
25 “Profile,” Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/about-dw/profile/s-30688. 
26 Ibid 
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frames of DW’s reporting on the protests in Macedonia through a focus on issues around 
freedom, human rights, democracy, good governance, and youth. The spread of these 
normative (Western) values are ultimately part of Germany as well as the EU’s broader 
foreign policy objectives. 
DW first began broadcasting to the Balkans in the 1960s during the Cold War. 
Serbo-Croatian radio broadcasting started in 1962 and ran until 1992 before being 
rebranded into Serbian and Croatian respectively.27 Macedonian-language broadcasting 
started in 1969 and has since continued.28 DW’s Macedonian service operates mainly 
through online news published via the broadcaster’s website and is headed by a single 
person based in Germany with several freelance journalists in Macedonia. Unlike DW, 
Sputnik News does not have a Macedonian-language edition, but just a 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian edition for the entire Balkan region. 
SPUTNIK NEWS 
Sputnik News emerged online in 2014 with the closure and merger of Russia’s RIA 
Novosti and Voice of Russia outlets under the umbrella of Rossiya Segodnaya.29 RIA 
Novosti launched during the Second World War and survived in various forms until 
becoming Russia’s state-owned international news outlet with the end of the Cold War. 
Similarly, Voice of Russia, previously Radio Moscow, operated as the USSR and Russia’s 
state-owned international radio service. Sputnik News describes itself as “a modern news 
agency whose products include newsfeeds, websites, social networks, mobile apps, radio 
broadcasts and multimedia press centers” that “covers global political and economic news 
 
27 “1960-1964,” Deutsche Welle,, https://www.dw.com/en/1960-1964/a-326452-1. 
28 “1965-1969,” Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/1965-1969/a-326466-1. 
29 Ben Nimmo, “Sputnik. Propaganda in a New Orbit: Information Warfare Initiative Paper No. 2,” Center 
for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), January 2016.  
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targeting an international audience.”30 Like Deutsche Welle, Sputnik News also offers 
online news in a wide variety of languages including Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, but not 
Macedonian. This is likely due to the present political ties between Russia and Serbia as 
well as the dominance of the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language in the former Yugoslav 
region (i.e. being intelligible to many Macedonian speakers).  
Considering Sputnik News’ nascence there have not been many scholarly analyses 
of the broadcaster as is the case with Deutsche Welle. Some scholars have argued that SN, 
like DW, serves as a tool of public diplomacy. As Sinikukka Saari has argued, in the 
aftermath of the color revolutions in many of Russia’s neighbors, increased public 
diplomacy and other efforts to manage the information space were given high priority by 
Russia’s foreign policy elites.31 In the lead-up to the formation of Sputnik News, Saari 
notes that there was “a substantial increase in the funding for and complete modernization 
of the RIA Novosti News Agency.”32 In this regard, as is the case with Deutsche Welle, 
Evan Potter has argued that Sputnik News “should be seen through the lens of a more 
holistic understanding of the role and function of a nation’s public diplomacy in the 
management of global public perceptions.”33  
However, other scholars looking at Sputnik News have argued the institution serves 
for Russian propaganda purposes which blurs the line with traditional public diplomacy.34 
Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, in their work on Sputnik News’ brief activities in 
Sweden, argue that Sputnik News: 
 
30 “About Us,” Sputnik News, https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html. 
31 Sinikukka Saari, “Russia’s Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase Its Influence in Former Soviet 
Republics: Public Diplomacy Po Russkii,” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 51. 
32 Ibid, 55. 
33 Evan H. Potter, “Russia’s Strategy for Perception Management through Public Diplomacy and Influence 
Operations: The Canadian Case,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14, no. 4 (2019): 405. 
34 Gary D. Rawnsley, “To Know Us Is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting in 
Contemporary Russia and China,” Politics 35, no. 3–4 (November 1, 2015): 274. 
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…regularly published articles pandering to pet-narratives with potential target 
groups, such as NATO expansion… and the chaos in Europe in the wake of the 
migration crisis... By targeting different groups with pre-existing… anti-NATO/EU 
sentiments, Sputnik can be said to have operated on the premise that these 
sentiments could be ‘nudged’, that is, further strengthened.35  
By “nudge,” the scholars are referring to Andrew Wilson’s description of Russian 
propaganda as operationalized “…by finding parties, politicians, and points-of-view that 
are already sure of their world-view rather than confused, and giving them a nudge..."36 
Other scholars have further argued, in line with Kragh and Åsberg, that SN is not just an 
element of Russia’s public diplomacy, but has an actively propagandist agenda. In this 
vein, some scholars have noted that Sputnik News can see as the use of “sharp power” i.e. 
they “…are not necessarily seeking to 'win hearts and minds,' the common frame of 
reference for soft power efforts, but they are surely seeking to manipulate their target 
audiences by distorting the information that reaches them.”37  
Regardless, this research does not attempt to engage the theoretical debate 
regarding the differences between propaganda and public diplomacy. Instead, it views both 
DW and SN as elements of Germany and Russia’s respective broader public diplomacy 
efforts. In order to extrapolate the intricate connections between the news texts, their 
production within a state-owned news organization, and the broader socio-political context 
– it is important to look at scholarly work related to news media, public diplomacy and 
international broadcasting, and protest movements. 
  
 
35 Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Public Diplomacy and 
Active Measures: The Swedish Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 6 (2017): 16-17. 
36 Andrew Wilson, “Four Types of Russian Propaganda,” Aspen Review, 2015, 
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37 Potter, “Russia’s Strategy,” 414.; Juan Pablo Cardenal et al., “‘Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian 




This section will explore the literature on public diplomacy and international 
broadcasting as well as the intersection of news media and protests. Studies of news media 
and news organizations have narrowed in on the important fact that the news is not an 
objective reality that is reported, but rather something which news organizations 
themselves (as well as other participants) actively create. As Roger Fowler has written,  
…the 'content' of newspapers is not facts… language is not neutral, but a highly 
constructive mediator… news is a practice: a discourse which, far from neutrally 
reflecting social reality and empirical facts, intervenes in… 'the social construction 
of reality'.38 
In this vein, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s famed Manufacturing Consent 
exploring American private media is a seminal work outlining how private news 
organizations are beholden to certain vested interests – bureaucratic, political, business, 
and others.39 Despite such research, the literature on news media as well as journalists has 
shown that their own perception of their roles revolves around “reporting the truth” and 
serving as the “fourth estate.”40 These contradictions between the public’s general belief 
that news is supposed to be objective truth and the fact that it is a layered and complex 
construction of reality has been an arena of scholarly debate for decades. However, much 
less scholarly analysis has explored these issues and their relation to state-owned 
international broadcasters. 
 
38 Roger Fowler, Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press (Routledge, 2013), 1. 
39 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 
40 Julianne Schultz, Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability, and the Media, Reshaping 
Australian Institutions (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING 
Unlike private news media, state-owned international broadcasters (such as 
Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News) are media institutions of a different kind. Their role 
goes beyond the private media’s mythical mission of “objectively reporting the news” and 
is intricately tied with the public diplomacy efforts of their respective countries. As Jarol 
Manheim has argued, public diplomacy refers to “… efforts by the government of one 
nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the 
foreign policy of the target nation to advantage.”41 Scholars have argued that these 
activities are components of a country’s broader foreign policy efforts and are focused on 
direct connections with the citizens of another country. Paul Sharp has similarly referred 
to public diplomacy as “…the process by which direct relations with people in a country 
are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented.”42 
More recently, scholars have tied public diplomacy to Joseph Nye’s conceptualization of 
“soft power.” Nye first referred to soft power arguing that “… when one country gets other 
countries to want what it wants might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the 
hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.”43 Nye has since connected 
his idea of soft power directly to public diplomacy noting that “public diplomacy is an 
instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and 
attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. Public 
 
41 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of 
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4. 
42 Paul Sharp, “Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy,” in The 
New Public Diplomacy : Soft Power in International Relations, Studies in Diplomacy and International 
Relations (Palgrave Macmillan Limited, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 106–23. 
43 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Pbk. ed. (New York: Basic 
Books, 1991). 
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diplomacy tries to attract … broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging 
exchanges, and so forth.”44  
In a similar vein, renowned public diplomacy scholar Nicholas Cull has highlighted 
that there are multiple aspects to public diplomacy. In particular, Cull notes “(1) listening, 
(2) advocacy, (3) cultural diplomacy, (4) exchange, and (5) international broadcasting.”45 
Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News, as international broadcasters, can be seen as the 
communicative arm of public diplomacy efforts seeking direct interaction with a foreign 
country’s public. As Cull has described, international broadcasting (IB):  
… is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by using the 
technologies of radio, television, and the Internet to engage with foreign publics. 
IB work as practiced by states can overlap with all the other public diplomacy 
functions including listening in the monitoring/audience research functions, 
advocacy/ information work in editorials or policy broadcasts, cultural diplomacy 
in its cultural content, and exchange in exchanges of programming and personnel 
with other broadcasters.46  
Similarly, Monroe Price and his colleagues have argued that “international broadcasting 
has been the elegant term for a complex combination of state sponsored news, information, 
and entertainment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state’s boundaries.”47 
A particularly crucial issue for international broadcasting is that of credibility. As 
O’Keeffe and Oliver argue, “… the prerequisite for a successful international broadcaster 
is credibility, and this is earned only if a broadcaster operates with complete editorial 
 
44 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 95. 
45 Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 31. 
46 Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” 34. 
47 Monroe E. Price, Susan Haas, and Drew Margolin, “New Technologies and International Broadcasting: 
Reflections on Adaptations and Transformations,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 152-153. 
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independence from its funding government.”48 In other words, international broadcasters 
while serving as a mechanism of their state’s public diplomacy efforts, must be seen as 
independent news institutions in line with the highest journalistic ethics and standards. If 
they are not, then their effectiveness is diminished or they are labeled as sources of 
propaganda. Nye has similarly noted that, “Skeptics who treat the term public diplomacy 
as a mere euphemism for propaganda miss the point. Simple propaganda often lacks 
credibility and thus is counterproductive as public diplomacy. Good public diplomacy has 
to go beyond propaganda.”49 Credibility becomes particularly important when news 
organizations, but especially international broadcasters, cover events such as protests 
taking place in a foreign country. 
MEDIA AND PROTESTS 
There is a strand of academic inquiry in the social movement and protest studies 
fields as well as the framing and media studies literature that attempts to link the two issues. 
In particular, the social movement studies field has examined how protesters engage the 
news media as part of their mobilization around specific social issues. In other words, how 
do protesters and social movements frame themselves and their concerns in order to get 
media attention for their cause with the hope that this will lead to public support. The 
protesters can be viewed as frame sponsors attempting to influence the news media. As 
Robert Benford and David Snow have argued, protesters are “viewed as signifying agents 
actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, 
 
48 Annmaree O’Keeffe and Alex Oliver, “International Broadcasting and Its Contribution to Public 
Diplomacy” (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, September 2010), 6, 
https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/international-broadcasting-and-its-contribution-public-
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49 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 101. 
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antagonists, and bystanders or observers.”50 However, protesters and social movements 
typically come up against resistance as they try to frame their cause. Scholars have 
described what is known as a “protest paradigm” in which the news media instead give 
preferential treatment to the status quo or mainstream and in turn marginalize the protests, 
seen as errant, in their reporting. McLeod and Detenber note that: 
The set of common characteristics that articulate this support have been codified 
into the concept of the “protest paradigm” …, which provides a template for the 
construction of a protest story. McLeod and Hertog (1998) classified characteristics 
of the protest paradigm into the following categories: narrative structures; reliance 
on official sources and official definitions; the invocation of public opinion; and 
other techniques of delegitimation, marginalization, and demonization.51  
The narrative structures in the paradigm relate to established frames that are utilized 
when covering protests. Examples of such frames include confrontation between police 
and protesters, rioting, a violence frame, and others which tend to paint a negative image 
of protesters. The paradigm also has an overabundance of sourcing from officials (such as 
government and the police) as this is standard journalistic practice. Again, this favors the 
status quo of those in position of power over the protesters. The incorporation of public 
opinion into the paradigm relates to the way journalists invoke bystanders or onlookers in 
order to “communicate the deviance of protesters by depicting them as an isolated 
minority.”52 Finally, references to protesters’ “appearance, language, beliefs, and goals” 
among other linguistic tactics in reporting are used to delegitimize, marginalize, or 
demonize their efforts. 
There have been a range of studies that have explored news media framing of 
protests such as the 1968 Democratic Convention protests, anti-war and anti-nuclear 
 
50 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 613. 
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52 Ibid 6. 
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protests in the U.S. and elsewhere, the Tiananmen protests, and the global justice 
movement in the 1990s.53 This literature showcases how the media engage in the protest 
paradigm. Furthermore, these studies show that private media. when reporting on 
international news, often like international broadcasters, still toe the line of their respective 
government’s official policy.  
More recent research has also explored media framing and protests such as Occupy 
Wall Street, the Indignados movements in Spain and Greece, the Egyptian Revolution, the 
Arab Spring protests, the 2013 anti-austerity protests in Cyprus, the Gezi Park protests in 
Turkey, and Thailand’s 2014 elections crisis.54 The latest trends in this research have seen 
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a decrease in the significance of the protest paradigm in news reporting. Scholars believe 
that with the advent of social media and the interplay between such direct communication 
and the news media there are more positive perceptions of social movements. In fact, 
through social media, protesters can circumvent the news media (and the protest paradigm) 
in turn receiving more favorable coverage.  
Lastly, there is a niche section of this literature that has explored media framing of 
color revolutions and protest movements much like the Colorful Revolution in Macedonia. 
In particular, scholars have explored the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine, 
the color revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, protests in Belarus and Uzbekistan, and 
the Green Movement in Iran.55 The studies that focus on the East European space have 
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come to similar conclusions in their analysis of reporting on the color revolutions. In 
particular, these studies have found that Western media (such as the New York Times or 
the BBC) tend to paint the protesters in a positive light, associate them with pro-democracy 
elements, give credence to their demands, and tie them to Western foreign policy efforts in 
the region. On the other hand, Russian media (such as Izvestia or RT) tend to favor regimes 
in power (if it suits their interests) and paint the protesters in a negative light.  
As such, it is important to clarify that the protest paradigm selectively applies to 
certain cases, particularly when it comes to international broadcasters. Some international 
broadcasters may frame protests or revolutions taking place outside their borders in a 
favorable way as it aligns with their country’s foreign policy objectives thus eschewing the 
protest paradigm. Other broadcasters may utilize the protest paradigm as it serves to further 
their country’s objectives. This dynamic plays into the analysis of this research as 
Germany’s Deutsche Welle eschews the protest paradigm in reporting on the Colorful 
Revolution whereas Sputnik News utilizes the protest paradigm in framing the protests. 
Overall, the interdisciplinary field connecting protests with news media has seen 
little analysis of state-owned international broadcasters when compared to private media 
and even less so on events, such as color revolutions, in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 
In fact, no one has written about media framing and protests in Macedonia making the 
present research a significant scholarly inquiry. The following section will provide an 
overview of Macedonia’s recent history, German and Russian interests in the Balkan 
region, and an outline of the Colorful Revolution protests. 
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Background 
Macedonia formally gained independence in 1991 with the disintegration of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since independence, Macedonia has made 
significant strides toward accession into the European Union (EU) and in 2020 formally 
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).56 All major political parties in the 
country have, since independence, openly declared their support for Macedonia’s Euro-
Atlantic integration goals and generally been active in pursuing these policies when in 
power. However, Macedonia finds itself at the “crossroads of Europe” in the heart of the 
Balkans and as such many regional and global powers have sought to gain influence in the 
country for their own strategic interests – Germany and Russia among them.  
GERMAN (AND EUROPEAN UNION) INTERESTS IN MACEDONIA 
Germany has had strategic interests in the broader Balkan region since the 19th 
century. During the Second World War, Nazi Germany was allied with and supported 
fascist Bulgaria’s occupation of Macedonia.57 Despite this history, during the Yugoslav-
era many Macedonians and other Yugoslavs went and worked in Germany as 
Gastarbeiters.58 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, German foreign policy toward Macedonia 
has become deeply connected and aligned with that of the European Union. This revolves 
around supporting Macedonia’s integration into the European Union and NATO. However, 
Germany as well as other major European players such as France are also keen on keeping 
stability in the Balkan region following the wars in the 1990s. As such, European foreign 
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policy, despite seeking to promote democracy across the Balkan region is more focused on 
stability. As Theresia Töglhofer and Cornelius Adebahr have argued:  
…stability has become the most frequently cited reason for supporting the EU’s 
widening towards the Balkans. Across the board, there is a shared perception 
among decision-makers and foreign policy experts that any new conflict situation 
would have clear repercussions on Germany. Therefore, neglecting these states 
would in the long run be more cost-intensive than engaging with them under the 
current Stabilisation and Association Process. In addition, the potential for 
democratic transformation and economic development via European integration are 
among the reasons most frequently invoked by German officials to argue in favour 
of EU enlargement to the Balkans.59  
As such, Germany as well as the European Union have pandered to and supported 
autocrats across the Balkans – including in Macedonia – in the name of stability. Florian 
Beiber has described this system as “a stabilitocracy” or “… a regime that includes 
considerable shortcomings in terms of democratic governance, yet enjoys external 
legitimacy by offering some supposed stability… exchange of stability for external 
lenience on matters of democracy…”60 That external lenience is offered by EU institutions 
as well as major Western countries such as Germany, the United States, and others. 
Similarly, Germany (together with Austria and many other EU member-states) in 
prioritizing security in the region and at home focused heavily on Macedonia during the 
migrant crisis between 2015-2017. German leaders as well as those of other EU member 
states pressured Macedonia to close its border with Greece in order to deal with the large 
numbers of migrants heading to Western Europe via the Balkan route.61  
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Germany also heavily emphasizes economic relations with Macedonia. 
Consistently, Germany has either been Macedonia’s first or second most important trading 
partner.62 There are a number of major German companies in Macedonia, such as 
Draexlmaier, that employ thousands of people.63 Similarly, a large number of Macedonian 
citizens live and work in Germany on a short-term or even long-term basis.64 Many go as 
high-skilled workers such as doctors and medical professionals whereas others work in 
construction and the restaurant industry. As such, aside from economic relations, Germany 
strongly advocates for the study of the German language in Macedonia where it is the 
second most studied foreign language (after English).65 
Finally, there are several German non-profit organizations and political foundations 
such as Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung which are active on the 
political and civil society scene in Macedonia. Similarly, together with a range of EU 
mechanisms from IPA funds, EU Commission efforts, and European civil society groups 
– Germany plays an instrumental role in a range of “democracy promotion” related 
activities in Macedonia.66 These include supporting the efficiency of the parliament, 
trainings for political parties, supporting the training of lawyers and judges, among other 




62 “Germany and North Macedonia: Bilateral Relations,” German Federal Foreign Office, 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/mazedonien-
node/bilateral/228106. 
63 Sinisa Marusic Jakov, “Germany’s Draxlmaier to Invest in Macedonia,” Balkan Insight, March 23, 2012, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2012/03/23/germany-s-draxlemaier-invests-in-macedonia/. 
64 Ana Aceska, “Transnational Experts, Rooted Careers. Migrant Professionals from Macedonia in 
Germany,” Südost-Europa 64, no. 1 (2016): 79–95. 
65 Ibid 
66 Simonida Kacarska, “The EU in Macedonia : From Inter-Ethnic to Intra-Ethnic Political Mediator in an 
Accession Deadlock,” in The EU and Member State Building (Routledge, 2014), 102–21. 
67 Marija Risteska, “The Role of the EU in Promoting Good Governance in Macedonia: Towards 
Efficiency and Effectiveness or Deliberative Democracy?,” Nationalities Papers 41, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 
431–46. 
 30 
Berlin Process “is an initiative aimed at stepping up regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans and aiding the integration of these countries into the European Union” and was 
initiated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the fall of 2014.68 The process was 
launched by Merkel in the aftermath of EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
official statement that “there will be no new enlargement in the next five years…”69 The 
Berlin process consists of summits among the leaders of the Western Balkans and European 
partners as well as side meetings with civil society groups, a business forum focused on 
investment, and a youth forum dealing with youth issues in the region. Through these 
initiatives there is a coalescing of both German and EU interest in Macedonia and the 
broader Balkan region. 
RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN MACEDONIA 
Russian foreign policy toward Macedonia, like that of Germany, relates to larger 
efforts which it pursues across the broader Balkan region.70 However, although smaller in 
terms of its economic footprint than Germany, Russian policy in Macedonia is just as 
broad. On a sociocultural level, Russian politicians and officials often express rhetorical 
support for various Slavic and Eastern Orthodox populations in the Balkans including 
ethnic Macedonians. This supposed religious and cultural connection is often lifted to 
mythical levels to compensate for the lack of positive shared history between Russia and 
Macedonia. For example, Russian leaders have commemorated with Macedonian 
presidents the Sts. Cyril and Methodius (who were originally from the Macedonia region) 
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holiday as the origin of the Cyrillic alphabet.71 However, often to Macedonia’s detriment, 
Russia has historically supported Macedonia’s neighbors – Serbia and Bulgaria – from 
their independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century to the present.72 
Regardless, over the past thirty years, the Russian state as well as individual Russian 
citizens have begun to heavily invest economically and politically in the country.  
Russia is a major energy investor in Macedonia with both Lukoil and Gazprom 
having extensive reach. In particular, Lukoil owns many gas stations across the country 
and the Trans Balkan pipeline – operated by Russia – is the country’s main source of gas 
energy.73 In recent years, Macedonia hoped to become part of Russia’s now failed South 
Stream pipeline project. Despite the failure of South Stream – the Turk Stream alternative 
pipeline – has begun and with possible expansions Macedonia hopes to have a stake in this 
project. Aside from such state-sanctioned Russian investments in Macedonia there have 
also been a range of private investments from Russian businessmen and oligarchs. These 
individuals have invested in Macedonian sports clubs, hotels, the gambling industry, and 
more. The Russian businessman Sergey Samsonenko is widely known to own Football 
Club Vardar and Handball Club Vardar and financially supported the construction of the 
Rossiya hotel as well as a Russian Orthodox Church in the Aerodrom municipality of 
Skopje.74  
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On the political scene, in recent years (and especially during the political crisis 
between 2015 and 2017) the ruling nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) was 
seen as inching closer to Russia. The Macedonian President, Gjorge Ivanov, of the VMRO-
DPMNE has visited Russia and was warmly received many times during his tenure. 
Additionally, after existing in various formations since 2002, the United Macedonia party 
(renamed after Vladimir Putin’s United Russia in 2018) – a small Russophile party – 
launched an active effort to change Macedonia’s foreign policy and steer it more toward 
Russia rather than the West.75 This political element became increasingly salient during the 
political crisis in Macedonia and in the aftermath of the Colorful Revolution of 2016. 
Finally, in 2017 and following the Colorful Revolution, evidence emerged 
(reported by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project and The Guardian) 
that “Russian spies and diplomats have been involved in a nearly decade-long effort to 
spread propaganda and provoke discord in Macedonia.” In particular, the “[t]he Kremlin’s 
goal is to stop them from joining NATO and to pry them away from western influence… 
They also show efforts by Serbian intelligence to support pro-Russian and anti-western 
nationalists in Macedonia.”76 As such, this research assumes that Russia had an interest in 
the political crisis in Macedonia and the 2016 Colorful Revolution protests. As Christopher 
Walker has argued, “Russia, like China and Iran, sees an opportunity to exploit the 
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information space in the Balkans… A large part of Russia’s editorial efforts… are aimed 
at assailing the West, distorting perceptions of democracy, and tarnishing the image of the 
United States and the EU.” 77 In order to contextualize both Russian and German 
engagements in Macedonia it is important to review some recent history and events. 
MACEDONIAN POLITICS AND PROTEST 2006 – 2016 
Between 2006 and 2017, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski 
and his VMRO-DPMNE party, the general state of democracy in Macedonia significantly 
deteriorated. Following Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s accession to NATO at the 2008 
Bucharest Summit the country found itself at a standstill with the VMRO-DPMNE 
government unable to deliver on Euro-Atlantic integration. In the aftermath of this event, 
PM Gruevski and the VMRO-DPMNE slid toward a more nationalist and authoritarian 
path with marked drops in media freedom, a shrinking civil society space, stagnant 
economy, and international isolation.78 Scholars and observers have described the situation 
in Macedonia between 2009 and 2015 as “state-capture” referring to the fact that state 
institutions no longer function in the interests of citizens, but rather for those who have 
captured the state – in this case the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party and its business partners 
and cronies.79  
Under these circumstances, a range of anti-government protests emerged starting 
in 2011 around specific issues such as police brutality, media freedom and attacks on 
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journalists, LGBTQI rights, and education. By early 2015, a student movement emerged 
and was actively challenging the VMRO-DPMNE government.80 During the height of the 
student protests in February 2015 the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia 
(SDSM) seized on the momentum of civic activism and released to the public wiretapped 
recordings known as “bombs.”81  
These “bombs” marked the beginning of a political crisis which enveloped the 
country for the next few years and ultimately lead to the Colorful Revolution of 2016. The 
wiretapped recordings were alarming to domestic and international observers alike. It is 
assumed the Prime Minister Gruevski and his VMRO-DPMNE government wiretapped 
some 20,000 individuals in Macedonia. From journalists and opposition politicians to civil 
society leaders, foreign dignitaries, and ironically the VMRO-DPMNE leadership itself – 
all were caught on tape. The recordings include evidence of the VMRO-DPMNE party and 
its ministers handpicking judges, eavesdropping on journalists, joking about ethnically 
cleansing the Albanian minority, ordering the rape of opposition politicians in jail, rigging 
elections, giving public procurement bids to businesses in their favor, and even covering 
up murder.82  
These revelations led to massive protests led by a movement that came to be known 
as “#Протестирам” (#Protestiram) or “#IProtest.” This movement, whose protests were 
later joined by the opposition SDSM itself, called for the resignation of the VMRO-
DPMNE government. However, in the summer of 2015 leading political parties in 
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Macedonia (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM as well as two ethnic Albanian parties – the 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and the Democratic Party for Albanians (DPA)), 
under the banner of the European Union, signed the Przino Agreement in a bid to end the 
crisis. The Przino Agreement stipulated that a Special Prosecutor’s Office will be formed 
to investigate the wiretapped recordings, the incumbent government would resign in 
January 2016, and a technical government with ministerial positions shared by the parties 
would pave the way for elections in April 2016.83  
The implementation of the Przino Agreement stalled multiple times due to 
disagreements between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM. However, in September 2015 a 
Special Prosecutor’s Office was formally established and began to operate under the 
leadership of special prosecutor Katica Janeva. Investigations into VMRO-DPMNE 
officials, based on the content of the wiretaps, were immediately opened. In January 2016, 
PM Nikola Gruevski resigned per the Przino Agreement to pave the way for elections in 
April. However, the opposition SDSM argued at the time that not enough reforms were 
made, including the vetting of the electoral list or freedom of the media, for free and fair 
elections to be held. The crisis continued anew, the EU and US once again engaged the 
political parties, who then came to a new deal to postpone the elections until June 5, 2016. 
As part of this process, the Parliament dissolved itself in early April 2016. 
COLORFUL REVOLUTION 
A week after the parliament had disbanded, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov 
– a supporter of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE – announced on April 12, 2016 that he was 
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pardoning all 56 officials under investigation by the Special Prosecutor in order to “break 
the tension before the elections.”84 This immediately sparked outrage among the broader 
public who amassed in Skopje. The first night of protest was marred by violence with 
protesters demolishing and setting on fire the President’s office in central Skopje. In the 
aftermath of the pardons, a new protest movement, pushed forward by the previous 
“#IProtest” movement, took to the streets. The movement ultimately came to be known as 
the “Colorful Revolution” because protesters used paint to color various government 
buildings and monuments around Skopje to showcase their disapproval with the pardons 
and government.85 It was also a play on words regarding the idea of a Color Revolution, 
like those that took place across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which was commonly 
used in propaganda by the government against the protests. The term is also common in 
academia. Scholars Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik have described color revolutions, 
or electoral revolutions, as “attempts by opposition leaders and citizens to use elections, 
sometimes in combination with political protests, to defeat illiberal incumbents or their 
anointed successors; to bring liberal oppositions to power; and to shift their regimes in a 
decidedly more democratic direction.”86 Indeed, the ultimate goal of the Colorful 
Revolution movement in Macedonia was the removal of the VMRO-DPMNE from power. 
The protesters gathered nightly at 6:00pm in front of the Special Prosecutor’s Office (in a 
sign of support for the legal proceedings against corrupt officials) and marched to various 
government buildings (parliament, ministry of justice, government headquarters).  
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As the Colorful Revolution protests continued to garner more support and spread 
to other cities in Macedonia – the ruling VMRO-DPMNE government supported the 
creation of the Citizens Movement for the Defense of Macedonia (GDOM) as a way to 
show support for their rule and serve as a rival movement to the Colorful Revolution.87 In 
April, both movements continued to gather every evening without any physical 
altercations. In May 2016, early parliamentary elections which had been scheduled for June 
were officially postponed, once again, due to the opposition SDSM and ethnic Albanian 
parties refusing to participate until conditions were formally met to hold free and fair 
elections. As the protests continued into the summer, with pressure from the EU and US, 
President Ivanov reversed his decision and revoked all his pardons. Despite this, Colorful 
Revolution and GDOM protests continued albeit in smaller gatherings until the start of the 
election campaign in November. Early parliamentary elections were officially held on 
December 11, 2016. It is this period – that lasted from April 2016 with the pardons until 
elections in December 2016 – and the reporting of Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News 
which will be analyzed in the next section. 
  
 




This section will analyze the online news stories from Deutsche Welle and Sputnik 
News regarding Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution and the news frames present within 
them. In particular, 94 online stories from DW – 24 of which in English and 70 in 
Macedonian as well as 84 online stories from Sputnik News – 22 of which in English and 
62 in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian were reviewed. The news frames will be unpacked using 
Entman’s operationalization of frames i.e. that they define a problem, state the cause, make 
a moral judgement, and offer a remedy. Additionally, this analysis will explore the various 












Figure 1 List of Potential Framing Devices 
Furthermore, in exploring the news frames, it will be important to also note what is 
omitted from the reporting and what is highlighted in the news texts. Each section will first 
examine the regular news texts and then also provide a separate analysis of the opinion 
pieces and commentary news at the end. Finally, the frames and their subsequent narratives 
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will be compared with the official foreign policy statements of the German and Russian 
Foreign Ministries regarding the Colorful Revolution protests in Macedonia. 
DEUTSCHE WELLE REPORTING IN ENGLISH 
Through a qualitative reading of DW’s twenty-four English-language news stories 
on the protests in Macedonia from April 2016 to December 2016 – this research found two 
overarching news frames. The first frame, domestic crisis, focuses on how the situation in 
Macedonia is a domestic crisis emanating from internal political issues rather than a 
geopolitical conflict between East and West as was presented in most international private 
media. The second frame, rule of law, focuses on the importance of the rule of law in 
Macedonia and the role of the newly formed Special Prosecutor’s Office. 
Domestic Crisis Frame 
The domestic crisis frame is operationalized in Deutsche Welle’s reporting as 
follows. First, the problem is framed as the general state of corruption in Macedonia. 
References to issues related to state-capture – domestic political and economic interests 
misusing the state administration and resources for personal benefit – are prevalent 
throughout DW’s reporting. The cause of this problem is identified as the VMRO-DPMNE 
government and the small clique of individuals around former Prime Minister Nikola 
Gruevski. This overall situation is then judged negatively – especially in terms of 
Macedonia’s prospects for accession to the European Union. Finally, the domestic crisis 
frame presents a remedy to these issues by giving legitimacy to the anti-government 
protests and their broader demands for change in Macedonia. 
In framing the problem as domestic corruption, DW’s reporting focused on the 
economic impacts incurred by Macedonian citizens and how that related to dissatisfaction 
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expressed during the protests. In a video explainer about the protests, DW’s reporter notes 
that “the government is spending a lot of money on monuments... spending too much 
money when the unemployment rate is at 25%... ”88 Another article, looking at youth and 
their future in Macedonia in light of the protests, stated that “Youth unemployment tops 50 
percent, and precarious working conditions and poverty are part of life for most young 
people.”89 Not only do both of these examples evoke domestic corruption problems in 
Macedonia, but they serve to highlight DW’s mission to report on the economy and youth 
in developing countries. The use of terms such as “unemployment,” “precarious,” and 
“poverty” serve to paint a negative image of the lived experiences of everyday 
Macedonians. 
In describing the cause of these problems, DW’s domestic crisis frame directly 
points the finger at the VMRO-DPMNE government. Statements such as “the government's 
tight control over the press and the conduct of elections” and “only a year or so ago, people 
were afraid to loudly criticize the government in bars and cafes” not only place blame on 
the government, but openly make the case for the government’s autocratic behavior.90 One 
of these articles, written by a local Macedonian journalist for DW, goes so far as to describe 
the government in the following way: 
In the past 10 years, Gruevski and his cronies built a corrupt system based on 
intimidation and clientelism, but also on limiting women's rights and promoting 
machoism, chauvinism, homophobia and anti-feminism.91  
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Terms such as “afraid,” “tight control,” “cronies,” corrupt system,” “clientelism,” 
“intimidation,” and “limiting” all serve to present an image of an authoritarian state of 
affairs in Macedonia. They are also a common set of vocabulary often used to describe 
autocratic states and as such these terms serve as an intertextual link so the reader can 
connect the situation to other familiar contexts where a country has been described in the 
same way. 
In producing a moral judgement, the frame highlights corruption as well as 
impunity (particularly President Ivanov’s pardons which sparked the protests) and how 
these actions negatively reflect on Macedonia’s prospects for EU integration. Statements 
such as “… the US and EU warning the move [President Ivanov’s pardons] could hurt 
Macedonia's chances of joining the 28-nation bloc” and “…EU officials demanded that 
President Ivanov revoke the pardons, and urged the country's political parties to ‘find a 
common agreement that serves all citizens’” are emblematic of these concerns.92 Another 
DW article directly quotes a German official: “German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, whose country holds the rotating chair of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), said the pardons were ‘detrimental to the rule of law.’”93 
Phrases such as “rule of law,” “citizens,” “agreement,” and “urged” are used to signify the 
need for resolution and that the situation as it is cannot stand. Finally, the frame offers 
legitimacy to the protests and their demands as a remedy to the situation. Statements that 
directly note the protesters demands, such as “…demands are clear: First among them is to 
revoke the blanket pardon made by President George Ivanov. Second is Ivanov's 
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irrevocable resignation. And parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for June 5, are 
to be delayed,” are an example of this.94  
The frame accomplishes this operationalization via problem, cause, judgement, and 
remedy through a range of framing devices. To reinforce the domestic nature of the crisis, 
DW’s English-language reporting repeatedly refers to and quotes “citizens.” The use of the 
term citizens, as in “ [t]he president's move, called unconstitutional by pundits and citizens 
alike,” evokes notions of citizenry and belonging to the country rather than the influence 
of some outside actor.95 Furthermore, rather than simply reporting on the protests, DW’s 
use of “citizens” presents the events and problems as seen through the “protesters’ eyes.” 
For example, “[i]n protesters' eyes, the president's pardon is yet another signal that their 
government is corrupt at worst and incompetent at best.”96 The objective here is to give 
DW’s reporting more legitimacy in that the news text is not subjective but objectively 
informed by “citizens” and seen through their “eyes.”  
Similarly, DW avoids the “protest paradigm” in their reporting and utilizes positive 
phrases in describing the actions of the protesters. Rather than protesters vandalizing 
monuments by throwing paint, DW writes that “Bright colors are everywhere in downtown 
Skopje” and that “they [the protests] are truly colorful - not only because they have painted 
the symbols of Gruevism in Skopje, but also for their ethnic, religious and cultural 
diversity.”97 Words such as “colorful,” and “diversity” provide positive and light-hearted 
connotations rather than negative and frightful ones. Aside from this focus on citizens and 
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the protests, DW’s English-language reporting also honed in on the Special Prosecutor’s 
Office as part of the rule of law frame. 
The Rule of Law Frame 
The rule of law frame in DW’s reporting presents the same problem, cause, and 
judgement as that of the domestic crisis frame. However, rather than presenting the protests 
and their demands as a remedy, the rule of law frame highlights the role of the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office as essential to resolving Macedonia’s problems. As noted earlier, 
Macedonia’s Special Prosecutor’s Office was formed to investigate the wiretapped 
recordings that were revealed in 2015. For months, the office had been opening cases into 
alleged corruption by VMRO-DPMNE officials. These are the investigations which 
President Ivanov’s pardons halted and which led to the Colorful Revolution. Deutsche 
Welle’s news texts directly signify the EU and Germany’s role in the creation of this 
institution. They serve as an intertextual link to previous reporting about the creation and 
importance of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. For example, “As a part of the EU-brokered 
deal, Macedonia also set up a special prosecutor to investigate the wiretapping 
revelations.”98 Other news texts go on to note the successful work of the office, such as 
“the Macedonian Special Prosecution has identified the domestic intelligence service as 
the source of massive illegal surveillance in the country.”99 Others directly signify 
dissatisfaction with the President’s decision: “The domestic opposition, as well as the 
United States and European Union, had protested the decision to suspend the 
investigations, warning that Ivanov was stopping politicians from being held to 
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account.”100 This creates a link to the judgement (i.e. that corruption as well as the pardons 
are bad for Macedonia’s future) in that it ties Western interests in the country to those 
calling for the end of impunity and the prosecution of corrupt officials domestically.  
In terms of framing devices, some of DW’s English-language texts use hyperbole 
to portray the importance of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. One article notes that the 
“Special Prosecution body in Macedonia was set up to rein in corruption and criminal 
conduct by officials. It is led by three women who have become national heroines”101 Not 
only is the institution seen as powerful in that it can “rein in” corruption, but the prosecutors 
tasked with this work are seen as heroes. Such phrases attempt to give formal legitimacy 
to the institution by noting that it receives public support. This rule of law frame also 
appears in DW’s Macedonian-language reporting as will be elaborated upon in the 
following section. 
Opinion Pieces in DW English Reporting 
There were only two opinion pieces in DW’s English reporting and both were 
written by the head of DW’s Macedonian-language service based in Germany. The articles 
are sharp in their criticism of the VMRO-DPMNE government and call for the support of 
the European Union. For example,  
Over the past 10 years, Macedonia's ruling national-conservative VMRO-DPMNE 
has imposed complete control over the state, its institutions, the judiciary and the 
media. During his reign as prime minister from August 2006 until he stepped down 
under pressure this year, VMRO leader Nikola Gruevski - with the help of his 
partner, the former guerrilla commander Ali Ahmeti, who was brought in to 
represent Macedonia's large Albanian community - built an authoritarian regime 
 
100 AP/AFP/dpa/Reuters, “Macedonia's President Ivanov revokes all pardons in wiretap scandal,” DW 
News, June 6, 2016. https://www.dw.com/en/macedonias-president-ivanov-revokes-all-pardons-in-wiretap-
scandal/a-19310761. 
101 Ozimec, “Special Prosecution.” 
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based on clientelism that pervaded every aspect of society, including, as revelations 
of wiretapping make clear, citizens' private lives.102 
This is a clear portrayal of the autocratic nature of the VMRO-DPMNE government and 
their system of state-capture. The opinion piece directly refers to the government as “an 
authoritarian regime.” As was mentioned earlier, DW’s English-language reporting 
focused on the diversity of the protests and unity between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic 
Albanians. However, the opinion piece criticizes the ethnic Albanian party, the Democratic 
Union for Integration, and their leader Ali Ahmeti for being in the ruling coalition with 
VMRO-DPMNE. In this way DW draws a distinction between the unity of Albanians and 
Macedonians protesting in the streets and the ruling ethnic Albanian DUI’s unity with the 
VMRO-DPMNE “regime.” 
Furthermore, in calling for Western support to the protests and the process of 
democratizing Macedonia, the second opinion piece states that: 
The Macedonian patient is very sick and needs urgent help and attention from the 
EU and the international community. Otherwise, the crisis might easily endanger 
not only the existence of the country, but the stability of the whole region as well.103 
These sentiments echo the notion that the lack of democracy in Macedonia and the VMRO-
DPMNE’s government’s rule threaten the country thus aligning with both frames in 
presenting the government as the problem. This rhetoric also aligns well with Germany 
and the EU’s broader mission of democracy promotion in Macedonia. Similarly, it 
coalesces with the normative values of democracy and human rights which are fundamental 
to both Germany and the EU’s foreign policy efforts in the region. As will be seen – similar 
sentiments regarding Western support and criticism of the government were expressed in 
opinion pieces in DW’s Macedonian-language reporting. 
 
102 Georgievski, “Kleptocrats in Macedonia.” 
103 Boris Georgievski, “No cure for the Macedonian patient,” DW News, December 12, 2016, 
https://www.dw.com/en/no-cure-for-the-macedonian-patient/a-36736283.   
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DEUTSCHE WELLE REPORTING IN MACEDONIAN 
This section will analyze the seventy news texts that were published in DW’s 
Macedonian edition during the Colorful Revolution protests in Macedonia. Instead of a 
domestic crisis frame, DW’s Macedonian edition employs a divided country frame. Both 
the English and Macedonian language editions share a rule of law frame. 
Divided Country Frame 
The divided country frame in DW’s Macedonian-language reporting is manifest in 
the following ways. First, the growing politicization of the protests and the subsequent 
political division in the country is framed as the problem. The creation of a counter-protest 
movement by the VMRO-DPMNE government, to rival that of the Colorful Revolution, is 
seen as part of the cause of this division. The frame then judges this divided situation as 
detrimental to Macedonia’s future. Finally, in offering a remedy it reinforces the need for 
justice to be served as well as for politicians to take accountability and find a way out of 
the polarized political environment. 
In framing the problem and cause, DW’s reporting notes how both protest 
movements organize rallies and how their goals differ. For example: 
The counter-protest organized by the Civic Movement for the Defense of 
Macedonia (GDOM), which advocates for elections to be held on June 5 and gives 
support to the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, ended around 9:00pm. The protest in front 
of the government building, organized by “I Protest” ended around 10:00pm.104  
As the article makes clear, the Colorful Revolution protesters protest in front of the 
government building whereas the GDOM protesters protest in front of the opposition 
headquarters. In further depicting the differences between the two movements, another DW 
 
104 Katerina Blazevska, “Протестите - слика за поделена Македонија [The protests - a picture of a 
divided Macedonia],” DW News, April 14, 2016 https://www.dw.com/mk/a-19189965/. 
 47 
article remarks on their slogans and the individuals they reference. Emblematic of this are 
the following two examples. 
A peaceful protest was held with chants of ‘Nikola, it’s over,’ and ‘Nikola, 
dictator,’ and ‘resign’ at Ilindenska No. 2 while the police remained behind the 
protective fence. The situation was different earlier. The march started in from of 
the Special Prosecutor’s Office and continued toward the Parliament, but was 
blocked by the police with metal barricades in front of the Triumphal Arch. ‘The 
parliament is ours,’ ‘No justice, no peace,’ shouted the protesters in front of a 
cordon of special police units, their banners saying ‘there is no amnesty for 
mobsters’… 105 
The Colorful Revolution protesters, as described above, are seen shouting contemporary 
protest references such as “no justice, no peace.” The frame presents how the protesters 
link themselves to previous color revolutions in the region, i.e. that of the bulldozer 
revolution in Serbia, with the chant “Nikola, it’s over” which references the Serbian Otpor! 
movement’s slogan “He’s finished” regarding Slobodan Milosevic. The frame also alludes 
to how the protesters were “blocked by the police with metal barricades” to present their 
opposition to state authorities. The GDOM protesters are portrayed differently. 
At the counter-protest in front of SDSM headquarters, another song was sung: 
‘Nobody can do anything to you, Nikola.’ Organized by the Civic Movement for 
the Defense of Macedonia (GDOM), several thousand counter-protesters 
peacefully protested against the pardon of Zoran Zaev and Zoran Verushevski, but 
also against the opposition’s attempts to postpone the elections on June 5.106 
The GDOM movement is presented through their song “Nobody can do anything 
to you, Nikola” which portrays Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski as a strongman 
patriotically defending his country. However, this is presented pejoratively in Macedonian 
and portrays the protesters as enthralled with a Vladimir Putin wannabe. Another article 
 
105 Boris Georgievski, “Скопје, Битола и Струмица излегоа на улица, утре и Вашингтон [Skopje, 
Bitola and Strumica took to the streets, and tomorrow Washington],” DW News, April 16, 2016, 
https://www.dw.com/mk/a-19193567. 
106 SN/mf/meta, “Нова вечер на протести и контрапротести во Скопје [A new evening of protests and 
counter-protests in Skopje],” DW News, April 15, 2016. https://www.dw.com/mk /a-19192264. 
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similarly referenced how the GDOM protesters used traditional Macedonian instruments 
in their protests – when read in Macedonian it gives them an almost backward, uneducated 
rural image.107 The GDOM protesters are also presented in contrast to those of the Colorful 
Revolution based on who they are protesting against. Whereas the Colorful Revolution had 
Nikola Gruevski and former secret police chief Saso Mijalkov as targets, the GDOM 
protesters focused on opposition leader Zoran Zaev and former secret police chief Zoran 
Verusevski. This division further politicized the protests in turn marking the Colorful 
Revolution protests as anti-VMRO-DPMNE, but supposedly pro-SDSM whereas the 
GDOM movement was anti-SDSM, but pro-VMRO-DPMNE. 
This same scenario of division between the two protest movements played out 
repeatedly in DW’s almost daily reporting of the protests in the Macedonian edition. The 
reporting itself, in framing the division, served to further pit the Colorful Revolution 
protests against those organized by GDOM in support of the VMRO-DPMNE government. 
This reporting was complimented by a range of other stories that covered the future of the 
Special Prosecutor’s Office, the status of their cases into alleged crimes committed by 
VMRO-DPMNE officials, and the need for citizens to see accountability – even criminal 
accountability – on the part of officials. Ultimately, a quote from one of the articles 
summed up the frame: “With the new protest and counter-protest, Skopje was tonight once 
again a picture of an entirely divided Macedonia.”108 Interestingly, the GDOM counter-
protest movement did not feature at all in DW’s English-language reporting. However, the 
rule of law frame was shared by both the English and Macedonian version of DW’s 
coverage of the protests. 
 
107 Ibid  
108 Blazevska, “Divided Macedonia.” 
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Rule of Law Frame 
The second frame in DW’s Macedonian-language reporting mimics a frame that is 
also present in DW’s English reporting: the rule of law frame. Again, the problem here is 
the general sense of corruption and state-capture in Macedonia which is caused by the 
VMRO-DPMNE government. This is judged as something negative for the country and to 
remedy this situation the frame paints a positive image of the Special Prosecutor’s Office 
as a vehicle to overcome corruption in Macedonia. The reason the frame exists in both 
DW’s English-language reporting and in the Macedonian-language version is twofold. 
First, Germany and the EU (together with the U.S.) were instrumental in the creation of 
this institution as part of their mediation efforts in Macedonia during the 2015 political 
crisis. Thus, it is in their interest to see the Special Prosecutor’s Office succeed. Second, 
the Colorful Revolution protesters themselves began to give the Special Prosecutor’s 
Office and the three women that led it a symbolic weight in their fight for change. As such, 
the Colorful Revolution protests started every evening at 6:00pm in front of the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office as a gesture of support for the institution. Furthermore, what ultimately 
sparked the protests themselves was President Ivanov pardoning all the individuals under 
investigation by the institution.  
The problem in the frame is quickly identified in multiple news texts by referring 
to what sparked the protesters. For example: “Thousands of citizens are protesting in the 
streets of Skopje tonight against President Ivanov’s decision to declare a general amnesty 
for current and former functionaries suspected of criminal acts.”109 The cause of this 
problem is pinpointed squarely as the VMRO-DPMNE government. One DW article states: 
“By grossly distorting the facts, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE tried to place the first two 
 
109 Boris Georgievski, “Протести против Иванов на улиците на Скопје, уапсени и повредени [Protests 
against Ivanov in the streets of Skopje, arrested and wounded],” DW News, April 13, 2016. 
https://www.dw.com/mk/a-19185182. 
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indictments from the Special Prosecutor’s Office on a religious level. On the other hand, 
public hope for access to justice has increased.”110 By “on a religious level,” the author is 
referring to claims made by the VMRO-DPMNE government against the indictments 
arguing that their actions were justified since the SDSM opposition wanted to prevent the 
construction of a church in Skopje. In this way they could spin the discourse away from 
their officials being charged with corruption and toward a discussion about the VMRO-
DPMNE party’s support for the Orthodox Church and the SDSM’s purported antagonism 
to it.  
Furthermore, in reiterating the sign of approval in DW’s English version, an article 
in the Macedonian version highlights the same hyperbolic support for the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office: 
Three new faces give hope to a country shaken by an unending political crisis, 
corruption, and crime. The prosecutors from the Special Prosecutor’s Office 
became new heroines after promising the return of justice in Macedonia.111 
Another article goes on to quote a protester of the Colorful Revolution who applauds the 
Special Prosecutor’s work: 
“The prosecutors are a strong beam of light in the darkest situation of our country” 
said Bekiri [a protester]. “They are hope and a pillar of the country in which we 
want to build our future – where justice will be respected and all will be equal 
before the law.”112 
Finally, approval from Macedonian citizens is also highlighted to give further credibility 
to the Special Prosecutor’s Office: “The faces of the prosecutors Katica Janeva, Fatime 
Fetai, and Lenche Ristoska can now be seen on t-shirts, posters, badges, and even coffee 
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mugs. ‘Support for SPO’ has become the most popular shirt in Macedonia.”113 These 
images serve to provide a visual for the support given to the institution by Macedonia’s 
citizens. 
The rule of law frame in Macedonian is similar to that in English. However, there 
are some differences. First, DW’s English-language reporting framed the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office more as an important step toward EU accession whereas the 
Macedonian-language reporting was focused on how the institution could provide justice 
and hope to a society so accustomed to seeing impunity. Rather than describing how the 
rule of law is a prerequisite for EU accession and quoting European officials’ concerns, the 
Macedonian-language version of DW quoted Macedonian citizens and how they want to 
see corrupt politicians held accountable. This is because the Macedonian version of DW 
picked up on the fact that accountability and justice were prioritized and as such more 
salient among the protesters in Macedonia than was the discourse surrounding EU 
accession. 
Second, DW’s English reporting focused on the work of the office itself whereas 
the Macedonian reporting was more heavily focused around how citizens viewed the 
institution and gave it support via the protests. As such, the Macedonian edition of DW 
focused on how protesters gathered nightly in front of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, how 
the women leading the institution became symbols of hope, and how ensuring the survival 
of the institution gradually became part of their demands. Furthermore, in directly reporting 
on the institution, DW’s Macedonian service made it a point to describe the diversity of 
the three prosecutors. All three were women and one of them was Albanian. This was 




English-language reporting. This was contrasted with the criminal actions of the ethnic-
Albanian DUI party’s ruling coalition with the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE. These same 
issues of ethnic diversity and the state of justice in Macedonia feature in DW’s 
Macedonian-language opinion pieces. 
Opinion Pieces in DW’s Macedonian Reporting 
The opinion pieces in DW’s Macedonian-language reporting do not mimic entire 
frames, but certain elements. For example, the favorable image of the protesters, their 
ethnic diversity, and the importance of the protests for Macedonia’s future in both frames 
is reiterated in opinion pieces. For example, Lura Pollozhani and Dane Taleski argue that:  
In this moment, it seems that citizens have the power to create new interethnic 
relations and change the public space and rhetoric. The way to do that is to 
participate in the protests and at least create a present moment in which all citizens 
of Macedonia share the fate of the country and work together to create a democratic 
future as equal individuals.114 
Not only does this opinion piece give credibility to the protests as a mechanism for 
improving Macedonian democracy, but it also highlights interethnic relations. The piece 
argues that the ethnic diversity of the protests affords Macedonia a chance at realizing 
better interethnic relations between its people. As such, it furthers the favorable framing of 
the protests. Another opinion piece makes a similar claim about the importance of the 
protests: “Macedonia is protesting. Never before in their pluralistic history have citizens 
protested so much.”115 
 
114 Kura Pollozhani and Dane Taleski, “„Шарената револуција“ е шанса за нова, граѓанска 
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Beyond favorable analysis of the protests, DW’s Macedonian opinion pieces mimic 
those written in English and frame the VMRO-DPMNE government as part of the problem. 
A Macedonian-language opinion piece by the head of DW’s Macedonian service in 
Germany – titled “The ninth circle of the ‘captured’ state” – directly refers to this situation. 
It includes a paragraph that reads “Macedonia today is the poorest country in Europe. 
Macedonia today is probably the most corrupt country in Europe. There is no free media 
in Macedonia today ... There is no life in Macedonia anymore.” Aside from the grim picture 
of Macedonia’s democracy, the author places the blame squarely on the VMRO-DPMNE 
government:  
After ten years of rule by VMRO-DPMNE, clientelism, nepotism and corruption 
that produce personal gain for individuals or groups, caused damage that calls into 
question the very physical survival of the state. That system must change, and the 
government that practiced it must fall unconditionally.116 
Again, terms such as “clientelism,” “nepotism,” and “corruption” are used to paint a 
negative image of the government and convey that it has diverged from any democratic 
norms. However, statements made by German officials regarding the protests avoid such 
harsh language as will be seen in the following section. 
COMPARISON WITH OFFICIAL GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS 
Statements that were given by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 
Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution hit at many of the same issues present within the various 
frames utilized by Deutsche Welle. In particular, the framing of the problem as corruption 
and abuse of power features in multiple statements. For example, “The President’s decision 
to exempt politicians and officials accused of gross misconduct from criminal prosecution 
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is detrimental to the rule of law and legal certainty.”117 Similarly, “Allegations surrounding 
the abuse of power must be investigated in order for the Macedonian people to regain trust 
in the country’s democratic institutions” can be seen in the same light.118 The importance 
of Macedonia’s accession into European institutions is also highlighted in official German 
statements. This includes references regarding the need “to get their country back onto the 
European path,” “close cooperation with the EU Commission and the USA,” and “Only in 
this way will movement towards closer relations with the EU and the US be possible 
again”.119 Both statements on allegations of corruption and the need to continue on a 
European path align with frames DW utilized – particularly the framing of the problem and 
remedy. 
The most prevalent discourse in official German statements emphasizes the 
importance of the work of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. Firm statements showing 
support for the institution, such as “This decision [President Ivanov’s pardons]… 
undermines the work of the special prosecution service and its mandate to investigate all 
claims that power has been abused,” “The special prosecutor must be able to go about her 
work without let or hindrance,” “The Special Prosecutor must be able to perform her 
mandate without having obstacles placed in her way,” and “…it is important that the special 
prosecutor’s office tasked with investigating allegations of abuse of power can continue its 
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work freely in order to strengthen the public’s confidence in the country’s democratic 
institutions” echo these sentiments.120  
The emphasis on the Special Prosecutor in Germany’s official statements regarding 
the protests in Macedonia is twofold. First, as was noted earlier, Germany was an important 
factor in creating such an institution as part of the EU’s mediation efforts and the 
subsequent Przino Agreement in Macedonia. Second, in May 2016, just a few weeks after 
the protests started, German foreign minister Steinmeier appointed Johannes Haindl – a 
German diplomat – as special envoy for the situation in Macedonia.121 An integral part of 
Haindl’s role was supporting the EU’s ongoing mediation efforts in the aftermath of 
Ivanov’s pardons and the work of the Special Prosecutor’s Office in Macedonia. The 
alignment of the rule of law frames with these official statements signify that the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office was both important in Germany’s broader foreign policy efforts, it was 
locally salient among the protesters, and it furthered DW’s mission to report on democracy 
and rule of law issues. As such, it was an obvious frame for DW to push forward in both 
English and Macedonian. However, the Special Prosecutor’s Office is completely missing 
from the frames utilized by Sputnik News in their reporting on the Colorful Revolution. 
SPUTNIK NEWS REPORTING IN BOTH ENGLISH AND BOSNIAN/CROATIAN/SERBIAN 
This section will analyze the eighty-four news articles published by Sputnik News. 
Unlike DW, Sputnik News’ reporting in both English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 
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utilized the same three major news frames in reporting on the Colorful Revolution protests 
in Macedonia. The first frame, foreign meddling, focuses on the purported role of Western 
actors such as the United States, NATO, and the European Union in the protests in 
Macedonia. The second frame, ethnic conflict and regional destabilization, pushes forth 
the idea that ethnic minorities (particularly ethnic Albanians) manipulated the protests to 
harm Macedonia and destabilize the region. The third and final frame, law and order, 
revolved around the importance of abidance of laws, elected officials, and the constitution 
in light of the protests.  
It is important to recall that the English-language edition of Sputnik News, as stated 
on their website, targets an audience that is broader and more international. As such, the 
framing of the events in English is assumed to be more general and connected to other 
global issues or news events beyond the Colorful Revolution in Macedonia. Foreign 
meddling, for example, is a common news frame utilized by Sputnik News in their 
reporting across Eastern Europe and globally. However, there are a few cases in which 
some of the reporting in English is grounded in discourses that are rather niche to the 
Balkans. The reporting by Sputnik Srbija (i.e. Sputnik Serbia) in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 
on the other hand, is more locally salient to Balkan issues giving a priority to reporting on 
the region itself.  
Furthermore, Sputnik News in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian actively interviews and 
features opinion pieces by journalists, analysts, and other commentators living and working 
in the region. As such, the framing in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian makes references to issues 
which a broader international audience may not understand as they are particularly salient 
to the Balkan region. In distinguishing itself from other local news media, the Sputnik 
News BCS edition radio program (which features on their website), highlights that they 
“say what others keep quiet about.” Yet, the BCS edition of Sputnik News also utilized 
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global triggers such as “Ukraine” whereas the English edition did not. These differences 
will be elaborated on here and in the comparative analysis section. 
Foreign Meddling Frame 
The foreign meddling news frame in Sputnik News’ reporting is operationalized as 
follows. First, the protests in Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution are themselves framed as 
the problem. Second, Western actors such as the United States, the European Union, NATO 
as well as Western civil society organizations are cited as the cause of the protests. These 
actors are portrayed as supporters of the anti-government protesters as well as the 
opposition Social Democrats in Macedonia. Third, the articles judge the protests as 
detrimental to Macedonia’s stability. The protests and the involvement of Western actors 
are considered a deviation from normalcy. Finally, Sputnik News notes that as a remedy to 
overcome the situation it is important to respect Macedonia’s law, constitution, and hold 
elections as soon as possible. Within each of these operationalizations of the news frame 
(problem, cause, judgement, and remedy) there are a range of framing devices tied to 
rhetoric and discourse which are employed to better formulate the frame as such. 
In describing the protesters of the Colorful Revolution as the problem, Sputnik 
News’ English reporting used rhetoric that portrayed the protesters as aggressive. For 
example, references such as “Macedonian Protesters Smash Windows,” “violent 
demonstrations in the capital Skopje,” and “…supporters of the opposition were trying to 
break through the police cordons” are common throughout the news stories.122 The use of 
words like “smash,” “violent,” and “break” are utilized to create associations to violence 
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which is generally perceived negatively. Similarly, in openly stating “supporters of the 
opposition” rather than the broader “protesters” there is a subtle attempt to connect the 
violence and protests with the opposition Social Democrats in turn delegitimizing them. 
Both examples mimic the discourses often utilized in the protest paradigm. Furthermore, 
what is omitted in this reporting is the violence of and arrests by the police themselves. By 
using these framing devices, the protests are signified as the problem within the frame. 
Sputnik News’ reporting in BCS does the same in painting a negative light on the protesters 
and framing them as the problem. Phrases such as “they threw eggs at Ivanov's office,” 
“several hundred opposition supporters gathered in downtown Skopje,” and 
“confrontations with police” feature throughout and serve to paint the protesters negatively 
while again associating them with the opposition.123  
In determining the cause of this problem within the frame Sputnik News’ English 
reporting focuses on Western involvement highlighting it as intervention and foreign 
instigation in Macedonia’s internal affairs. The West is clearly defined as the cause of the 
problem with references such as “The EU and US wants President Ivanov to withdraw his 
decision” and “…amid increasing pressure from the EU, the US and NATO, who put a 
strain on the president…” and headlines such as “NATO Pressures Macedonia.”124 
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Through such phrases as “pressure,” “strain,” and “wants” there is a notion that the 
President is being forced to do something by outsider actors. In this way, Sputnik News’ 
reporting furthers the frame by elaborating the cause of the problem. In this case, Western 
involvement, by explicitly mentioning Western governments and organizations such as the 
US, EU, and NATO. 
Sputnik News’ reporting in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian used similar discourses when 
painting the West as the cause of the problem. Quotes from statements of Russian officials 
feature more prominently in the BCS news reporting. For example, “… the Macedonian 
opposition has once again become an instrument for stirring up internal political conflict, 
this time with foreign support,” “…Russia, which has accused the opposition of escalating 
violence with the support of ‘foreign factors’,” and a quote from the Russian Ambassador 
in Skopje who argued that the West’s actions “including overt manipulation of civic 
movements, can lead to catastrophic and unpredictable consequences, as has happened in 
other countries, including Ukraine.”125 Quoting from officials serves to provide the 
reporting with legitimacy as is common within the protest paradigm. Furthermore, the use 
of terms such as “political conflict,” “escalating violence,” “manipulation,” and “stirring 
up” all serve not only to point the finger at the West, but to highlight the negative impact 
of the West’s engagement. Similarly, the use of Ukraine and phrases such as “Ukrainian 
scenario” and “Ukrainization” serve as exemplars which intertextually link the reporting 
on the situation in Macedonia with that on the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine.126 However, 
 
125 Sputnik News. “Moskva: Nedopustivo aktiviranje „ukrajinskog scenarija“ u Makedoniji [Moscow: 
Inadmissible activation of the "Ukrainian scenario" in Macedonia],” April 14, 2016, https://rs-
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Bakljama i kamenicama na policiju [Skopje: torches and rocks at the police],” April 14, 2016. https://rs-
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lat.sputniknews.com/regioni/201604231105107119-Ambasador-Rusije-Makedonija/. 
126 Sputnik News, “Ukrainian Scenario.” 
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these references to Ukraine only appear in the opinion pieces of SN’s English reporting 
and not the regular news texts in English despite their salience for an international English-
speaking audience. The regular news texts focused on reporting from the ground in turn 
avoiding mentions of Ukraine. The opinion pieces, on the other hand, included commentary 
from Sputnik News staff working on topics beyond the Balkans and were thus able to 
incorporate the Ukraine issue into their discussions. Overall, the frame of foreign meddling 
has been utilized by other state-owned Russian news outlets in their reporting on the 
protests in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014 as well as the war in Ukraine.127 Despite the English 
news texts in SN eschewing discourse around a “Ukrainian scenario,” the BCS language 
news texts actively utilized it.  
The articles in BCS also more directly target the European Union and Western 
countries for their purported meddling in Macedonia. A misleading headline such as “EU: 
We won’t recognize the winner of the Macedonian elections” clearly served to directly 
smear the European Union as undemocratic.128 Similar such references include “The 
European Union may consider imposing sanctions such as travel bans and property freezes 
on Macedonian politicians who are obstructing the country's political crisis” and “The 
German envoy Johannes Heindl arrived in Skopje, and the arrival of the American 
representative Victoria Nuland was announced in a few days, which is interpreted in the 
Skopje media as new, increased pressure…”129 Both of these not only portend to show the 
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EU harming Macedonian politicians with travel bans and freezing their property, but also 
directly names Western government officials as applying pressure on internal Macedonian 
politics.  
Sputnik News’ English reporting similarly presents the judgement within this 
foreign meddling frame by noting an uncertain future as well as a potential loss of statehood 
and identity in Macedonia. Statements that display such sentiments include: 
If Washington’s involvement is a continuation of its support for the Macedonian 
opposition intended to undermine Russia’s influence, then the current political 
crisis will only deepen after the December elections. In other words, if the US-
backed parties win, Washington will have another “satellite” in the region.130 
As such, according to the frame, Macedonia will no longer be a sovereign country, but a 
“satellite” and the crisis affecting the country will only “deepen.” Direct references, in the 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language edition of Sputnik News, to stability and the impact 
the situation in Macedonia could have across the entire Balkan region also furthered the 
frame’s negative judgement. 
Finally, this foreign meddling frame includes a remedy that promotes the 
importance of Macedonian laws, the constitution, and respect for the elected government 
led by VMRO-DPMNE. The Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian edition of Sputnik News does this 
effectively with phrases such as “Ivanov continues to refuse to accept Western 
ambassadors…”131 Furthermore, it quotes Russian officials who claim a resolution to the 
situation will come “…by respecting the actions and decisions of the legitimate authorities 
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and leadership of Macedonia.”132 Through this President Ivanov is seen as pushing back 
against Western encroachment and the use of terms such as “legitimate,” “authorities,” and 
“leadership” seek to create a positive image of the government in turn delegitimizing the 
protesters. The second frame of ethnic conflict and regional destabilization follows a 
similar pattern.  
Ethnic Conflict and Regional Destabilization Frame 
Sputnik News’ reporting operationalizes the ethnic conflict and regional 
destabilization frame in the following way. Again, the protests are denoted as the problem. 
However, rather than Western foreign meddling and intervention as the cause, this time it 
is ethnic minorities that are portrayed as the instigators. This is again judged as something 
bad for the country with repeated references to attacks on Macedonia’s sovereignty. 
Finally, the news frame is completed with arguments calling for respect of the law and a 
continuation of the current VMRO-DPMNE government’s rule to remedy the situation.  
As was the case in the foreign meddling frame, the protests themselves are labeled 
as the problem. However, the cause now focuses on ethnic minorities in Macedonia. In 
particular, an English-language SN article describes a speech given by President Gjorge 
Ivanov who “… believes it's possible that the Balkan countries could be exposed to terrorist 
attacks…”133 The article then goes on to note that “Kosovo, the breakaway region of Serbia 
on Macedonia's border, has been called a ‘fertile ground for ISIS (Daesh)’ by the New York 
Times… Residents of Kosovo are predominantly ethnically Albanian and Muslim. 
Approximately one quarter of Macedonians were Albanian Muslims ...” In quoting 
President Ivanov and making claims which tie ethnic Albanians with ISIS and terrorism, 
 
132 Sputnik News, “Ukrainian Scenario.” 
133 Sputnik News, “Macedonian President Braces for Terrorist Attacks in Balkans,” July 28, 2016, 
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Sputnik News’ English edition is conjuring violence and adding it into the mix making the 
situation seem more volatile than it was. Furthermore, SN is connecting the protests and 
Ivanov’s security concerns through catchphrases such a “ISIS” and “terrorism” to a topic 
that a broader, international, and English-speaking audience can understand. While the 
protests are often seen as a legitimate form of expression, terrorism is more of a national 
threat dealt with by the state. Through this framing, the VMRO-DPMNE government is 
also afforded legitimacy to deal with the problem. Creating a security concern, such as 
terrorism, and tying it to an ethnic minority serves to obfuscate from the fact that protesters 
are in the street demanding the resignation of the government after revelations of 
corruption.  
Sputnik News’s Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language edition also plays on this 
theme of connecting ethnic Albanians to terrorism. However, it does it more often and in a 
more direct manner. For example, an article notes that “[t]he porous political situation in 
Macedonia and the extremist Albanian groups in Kosovo that continue to support the idea 
of a ‘Greater Albania’ could be a new spark in the region.”134 The use of the term 
“extremist” clearly ties this into the discourse on terrorism. The article goes on to note 
“This terrorist organization was already mentioned as the organizer of the attack in 
Kumanovo in Macedonia last year…” Again, the terrorism discourse is furthered and with 
the reference to Kumanovo (where a deadly confrontation between an armed Albanian 
group and the Macedonian police took place in 2015) SN is intertextually connecting the 
current news to that particular moment. In fact, the trial of those involved in the skirmish 
in Kumanovo has been ongoing and plagued with a lack of facts as to what really happened. 
Despite this, Sputnik News in BCS takes the official line offered by the VMRO-DPMNE 
 
134 Brankica Ristic, “Albanski teroristi se grupišu za napad (video) [Albanian terrorists group up for attack 
(video)],” Sputnik News, April 15, 2016, https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/politika/201604151104896709-
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government that these were members of a terrorist group that were going to attack various 
sites across Macedonia. However, unlike the English edition of Sputnik News, the BCS 
edition vaguely uses terrorism in referencing ethnic Albanians and the former Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) and avoids bringing up ISIS as was the case in English. This is 
done because referencing the KLA is more salient to a Balkan audience whereas references 
to ISIS are more applicable to an international, English speaking audience. 
The first article also mentioned “Greater Albania” while other articles describe 
some of the protests noting that “One of the banners reads ‘Albania, where are you, Ilirida 
is burning for you.’”135 These references to Greater Albania are more locally salient rather 
than something a global audience would be familiar with (although they appear in Sputnik 
News’ English-language opinion pieces as will be discussed below). Greater Albania refers 
to the idea that ethnic Albanians in the Balkans – particularly in Kosovo, but also 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece – want to break away from these countries and join 
Albania into a larger homogenously ethnic Albanian state. Most nations in the region have 
such mythological claims to a larger territory encompassing their ethnic brethren (for 
example Greater Serbia, Greater Macedonia, Greater Bulgaria, etc.) and the threat of such 
claims is often used to cause fear in other countries that they will lose part of their land. 
These references are something which ethnic Macedonians will quickly pick up on and 
view negatively. Thus, connecting the protests to this idea of a Greater Albania, as well as 
“Ilirida”  - which refers specifically to the idea of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia seceding 
to form their own state, can be seen as a way to delegitimize the protests themselves and 
even arouse ethnic conflict. Furthermore, as the December 2016 elections neared ethnic 
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Albanian politicians were targeted in further attempts to stir ethnic division. The ethnic 
Albanian Democratic Union for Integration was the focal point for two articles. Their 
headlines are indicative of the message they try to signal: “Skeletons in the yard of the 
leader of Macedonia's strongest Albanian party” and “Scandal in Skopje: Albanian party 
official chants KLA.”136 The first clearly seeks to paint Ali Ahmeti as a criminal or even 
murderer whereas the second attempts to arouse fears about the role of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army and potential separatist discourses in Macedonia. 
In providing a moral judgement and remedy for the frame – Sputnik News’ English-
language reporting focuses on the role of Nikola Gruevski. Quotes of claims made by 
former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski feature throughout. One article notes that 
“Gruevski always insisted the wiretapping allegations were invented to destabilize the 
government…” while another reiterates that Gruevski “…says the surveillance tapes were 
‘fabricated’ to destabilize the country and subsequent anti-government movements are 
supported by a US and EU-led agenda.”137 This discourse serves to judge the situation in 
line with Gruevski’s views that the protests are destabilizing Macedonia. This is matched 
up with the same remedy as in the foreign meddling frame that offers legitimacy to the 
VMRO-DPMNE government, but this time with statements arguing that the government 
has the ability to stop imminent terrorist attacks on its own territory. This proffering of 
legitimacy to the government coincides with the law and order frame in Sputnik News’ 
reporting. 
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Law and Order Frame 
The third frame which Sputnik News’ reporting on the Colorful Revolution in 
Macedonia employs is that of law and order. This frame is operationalized as follows: (1) 
the problem is again the protests led by the Colorful Revolution; (2) the cause is again the 
West and civil society groups; and (3) the moral judgement is again that this will be 
negative for the future of Macedonia. However, the remedy is focused on the role of 
President Ivanov and his constitutional authorities.  
Sputnik News’ English reporting, rather than paint President Ivanov and his 
decision to issue pardons as the cause of the Colorful Revolution – portrays the President 
favorably as a symbol of law and order in the country. References such as “Ivanov signed 
a decree to halt all the legal proceedings against the country’s politicians with an aim to 
end the political crisis in the country” feature throughout.138 In fact, President Ivanov is 
highlighted in the headline of five of Sputnik News’ English-language online stories and 
is directly quoted in even more stories. This is coupled with statements such as “…respect 
for the actions of the Macedonian authorities,” and references to “the Constitutional 
Court,” that note the importance of the constitution.139 Through this formulation of a 
remedy to the situation Sputnik News actively affords legitimacy to President Ivanov and 
the ruling VMRO-DPMNE government more broadly. In particular, the use of 
catchphrases such as “decree,” “authorities,” and “Constitutional Court” seek to extend 
legitimacy to the President and the VMRO-DPMNE government. Sputnik News’ English-
language reporting actively omits references to the Special Prosecutor’s Office as an 
institution with authority thus providing President Ivanov more legitimacy 
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Sputnik News’ reporting in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian features similar attempts at 
giving legitimacy to the Macedonian government. In fact, the statements are more direct in 
their affirmation of the government than those in the English version. For example, 
references to the “constitutional and legal framework of Macedonia” and similar phrases 
feature in multiple articles.140 Another article features President Ivanov flexing his 
authority with the headline: “Ivanov: I could have called in the army…”141 Another yet, 
notes how “... groups close to VMRO-DPMNE demanded a ban on non-governmental 
organizations, accusing them of ‘acting against the constitutional order of Macedonia’.”142 
This juxtaposes the presentation of the government as legitimate with the supposed foreign 
meddling of non-governmental organizations in Macedonia. Finally, another category of 
articles seeks to promote former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. One article, for example, 
describes the specifics of the technical government in Macedonia and how it was prolonged 
due to impediments to hold elections, arguing that “if the ministers from Gruevski's 
government have been returned, then it is logical for Gruevski to return to the post of prime 
minister.”143 Another article centers completely around Gruevski and is titled “Gruevski 
threatens Zaev: If Goce Delcev were alive…”144 The article goes on to state that “The 
leader of the ruling party in Macedonia, VMRO-DPMNE, Nikola Gruevski, sharply 
attacked his rival, the first man of the opposition, Zoran Zaev, telling his supporters that 
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Goce Delcev, if he were alive, would send his chief executor to "finish the show".” In other 
words, Gruevski paints Zaev as anti-Macedonian and that the founding father of Macedonia 
in the 19th century would execute Zoran Zaev. This type of sensationalist discourse feature 
prominently throughout Sputnik News’ opinion pieces in both language services. 
Opinion Pieces in Sputnik News 
The previous descriptions of the three frames in Sputnik News’ English and 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language focused on news reports. As such, it avoided 
discussing the various opinion pieces or commentaries that were published in the same 
period. Compared to Deutsche Welle, Sputnik News relied more heavily on opinion pieces 
or guest commentaries to further the frames that were utilized. In this way, more 
unsubstantiated, biased, or extreme viewpoints were included and served to present the 
frame in a more direct manner. Additionally, any attribution that such statements were 
made by Sputnik News directly or by Russian government officials could be avoided. In 
turn, it allowed SN to maintain a façade of credibility while still publishing such 
commentary. 
The foreign meddling frame, in identifying the West as the cause of the problem 
(the protests), relied heavily on commentary in both English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. 
For example, in Sputnik News’ English reporting, statements from opinion pieces such as 
“US’ second regime change operation against the Republic of Macedonia” and “U.S. 
ambassador Jess Baily is complicit in all of this” serve to directly incriminate the United 
States as influencing and even orchestrating the protests.145 Here, key terms such as 
“regime change” seek to connect Western actors with the protests in turn delegitimizing 
 
145 Andrew Korbyko, “Saudis and 9/11, Israel and Occupied Golan, Macedonia and Regime Change,” 
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them. The interviews and opinion pieces in the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language version 
of SN take these claims and further them even more. For example, one opinion piece argues 
that the situation in Macedonia is just “…another experiment by the international 
community that has full control over the political processes in Macedonia” and that some 
political parties in the country operate “…exclusively under the direction of the American 
Embassy.”146 Another piece highlights that the “…international community, led by 
America and Germany, has decided to take matters into its own hands.”147 
Similarly, other opinion pieces in SN’s English version go beyond just implicating 
Western governments, but also civil society groups. For example, “In Macedonia, Soros 
and USAID finance the ‘fighters’ from Canvas and the Sorosites from ‘Open 
Society’…”148 Another commentary, which refers to an opinion piece written in a domestic 
Russian news outlet, argues that  
… a number of OSF (referring to Open Society Foundation) inner documents were 
stolen by hackers and published on the internet. In particular, they describe the 
strategy of mass protests in Macedonia. For example, the strategy included staging 
street protests, training activists, organizing public discussions etc…149  
The article then goes on to list how “US institutions” including “the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the 
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US embassy and some others” are engaging in this strategy. These references to “Soros” 
and “Canvas” serve not only as catchphrases familiar to those following the Balkans, but 
to a broader international audience. George Soros has become the ultimate boogeyman 
around the world and the work of his Open Society Foundation has been criticized by 
Russia and other countries for “intervening” in the internal affairs of other counties. Canvas 
is much more locally salient to the Balkans as it refers to the group that helped organize 
the protests in Serbia in 2000 that came to be known as the Bulldozer Revolution. The fact 
that Canvas is referenced in the English version of Sputnik News rather than in BCS is 
peculiar. The reason that this happened is that many of the English version opinion pieces 
in Sputnik News seek to get in touch with people in Macedonia. As such, the references 
and discourses of those in Macedonia are more locally salient rather than targeted to an 
English-speaking international audience. As such, locally salient discourses from the 
Balkans – such as those on Canvas – make their way into the English edition via quoting. 
In fact, in this case, the English-language opinion pieces referenced a local Macedonian 
journalist who mentioned Canvas in their statements. Similar references to non-
governmental organizations are common in Russian state-media as well as domestic media 
in the Macedonia that seek to target civil society groups funded by the West. USAID and 
Open Society are among the biggest Western donors funding civil society groups in the 
world.  
The opinion pieces and interviews in the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian version again 
go even further. For example, in one interview a Macedonian journalist claims that the “US 
Ambassador hits hard. Buys people. Travels around Macedonia with a suitcase of money 
and funds NGOs and Soros organizations." In another interview, Andrew Korbiko from 
Sputnik News’ English edition argues that: 
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The ground for the latest events in Macedonia, as well as in the rest of the Balkans, 
has been prepared by non-governmental organizations, but for now, the 
Macedonian authorities are holding up well. The causes for the West's unrest and 
destabilization of Macedonia should be sought in the growing economic and 
political influence of Russia and China in the Balkan countries.150 
This statement not only ties the purported foreign meddling of Western countries 
to non-governmental organizations but connects the foreign meddling frame to that of 
destabilization. In providing a remedy in most of the frames as well as the general 
sentiments of the law and order frame, SN used opinion pieces in both English and BCS to 
positively portray the Macedonian government and President. For example, in an interview 
in English one of the guests references a Macedonian journalist who talked about the 
“democratically elected and legitimate and very popular Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski” 
and claimed that Macedonian president Gjorge Ivanov was “the only functional official 
with Constitutional prerogatives.”151 The terms – “democratic,” “elected,” “legitimate,” 
“popular,” “functional,” “official,” and “constitutional” – associated with political 
legitimacy are utilized to further the argument that the status quo of the ruling political 
party is needed to resolve the crisis in Macedonia. In this way Sputnik News’ opinion 
pieces complement the foreign meddling frame which constructs the protests as a problem 
created by Western foreign interference that can only be resolved by respecting the laws 
and legitimacy of the current VMRO-DPMNE government. 
Finally, the framing of ethnic minorities – particularly ethnic Albanians – as a cause 
of the problems is the most common feature in both the English and 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian opinion pieces that Sputnik News published. Oddly, references 
to “Greater Albania” feature in numerous English-language interviews and opinion pieces. 
For example, the “threat of Greater Albania,” “one step closer to a Great Albania supported 
 
150 Andrew Korbyko, “Macedonia and Regime Change.” 
151 Ibid; Stokan and Korbyko, “Macedonia Color Revolution.” 
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by the West,” “… Albanian-majority cities in occupied Kosovo, the Republic of 
Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro are joining with Tirana to form the so-called Union 
of Albanian Municipalities’” and the notion that Macedonia may “become federalized and 
eventually be partitioned between Albania and Bulgaria.”152 What’s peculiar about this is 
the fact that the concept of a Greater Albania is a very locally salient issue to the Balkans, 
as was previously described, and likely doesn’t resonate with an international English-
speaking audience as say the discourses surrounding terrorism might. In fact, looking at 
both regular news texts and opinion pieces in English, references to Greater Albania and 
similar terms feature more often than do references connecting Albanians to ISIS and 
terrorism. The reason for this, again, is that a Macedonian journalist is a guest on a podcast 
and so they are using locally salient language to describe the situation. Yet, non-Balkan 
individuals such as the host of a podcast – Andrew Korbiko – also makes references to 
Greater Albania in English and when interviewed for Sputnik News in BCS. As such, it is 
likely that Sputnik News, in gathering opinion pieces, does not cater to specific audiences 
and overtly uses broad strokes to further its frames. However, as the next section will show, 
Russian officials including Foreign Minister Lavrov have referred to Greater Albania in 
interviews and official statements regarding the protests in Macedonia. As such, Sputnik 
News may deem the references applicable for use across language services. 
The commentaries in the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian edition of Sputnik News take 
framing of ethnic division and pointing the finger at Albanians to an extreme. Statements 
in that vein include:  
 
152 Stokan and Korbyko, “Macedonia Color Revolution.”; Andrew Korbyko, “US-Cuba Deal After Fidel, 
'PropOrNot' Jumps the Shark, Ugandan Unrest,” Sputnik News, December 4, 2016, 
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ugandan-unrest/.; Andrew Korbyko, “Macedonia and Regime Change.” 
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“Albanians taking to the streets reveals the true nature of the opposition protests, 
but also leads to chaos in Macedonia”153 
“It will become a kind of federation of Albanians and Macedonians; Greater 
Albania will become a reality in Macedonia, and Macedonians will get their own 
Kosovo.”154 
“…in all our countries, traitors and mercenaries and Shiptars [ethnic slur for 
Albanians], which the Americans turn on and off when it suits them…”155 
“The main cause of instability in Macedonia are Albanians…”156 
 
The use of terms such as “chaos,” “federation,” “traitors and mercenaries,” and 
“instability” are all signaling not only ethnic conflict, but also the lass of Macedonian state-
hood due to federalization. These catchphrases are locally salient for ethnic Macedonians 
and are used to stir up animosity toward ethnic Albanians. However, these locally salient 
discourses surrounding ethnic problems in Macedonia also find their way into statements 
given by Russian officials. 
COMPARISON WITH OFFICIAL RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS 
As was the case with statements from Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
statements from Russian officials map on and imitate the frames that were utilized in 
Sputnik News’ reporting. For example, with regard to the foreign meddling frame, a 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement released just two days after Macedonian 
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President Ivanov announced his pardons, read: “We state that the Macedonian opposition 
has again become a tool for instigating, including with external support, an internal political 
conflict to disrupt an early election scheduled for June 5, 2016, which is seen as the only 
democratic legitimate way to end the protracted crisis.”157 Another statement in July 2016 
states: “Using the same tried and tested schemes with the involvement of an ‘aggressive 
minority’ that has been paid from the outside, the ground is being prepared for provoking 
another colour revolution, this time in Macedonia.”158 Clearly, both Russian officials and 
Sputnik News utilize the frame of foreign meddling and promote a narrative of Western 
interference (and attempts at regime change) in Macedonia.  
Similarly, the ethnic conflict and destabilization frame is also utilized. A press 
statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 14, 2016 states that “We 
consider it inadmissible to shake the fragile situation in Macedonia, which is rooted in the 
complicated ethnic and religious structure of that country… attempts to inspire illegal 
actions and a coup d’état from the outside are fraught with deep shocks for Macedonia and 
destabilisation for the Balkans.”159 This in a way blends both the ethnic conflict issues and 
those of foreign meddling as leading to destabilization for Macedonia – something which 
was repeated over and over in Sputnik News’ reporting in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. 
Furthermore, a press release of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview in 
Belgrade with Sputnik News’ Serbian-language edition, notes Minister Lavrov stating “I 
have also heard about another project based on quite a negative idea. It is called Project of 
Albanian Municipalities and consists of the municipalities of Albania, Pristina, Macedonia, 
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Montenegro and Presevo Valley forming an association. If this is not the same old idea of 
creating a Greater Albania, our EU colleagues should probably be more far-sighted.”160 In 
essence, Lavrov is arguing that the EU supports Greater Albania and as such is making a 
direct reference to locally salient issues of borders and ethnic divisions while also bringing 
in the role of Western actors.  
Finally, references related to the law and order frame are also made directly by the 
Russian foreign ministry and Russian Embassy in Skopje in their statements during the 
Colorful Revolution. Russian Ambassador Oleg Shcherbak in an interview openly stated 
that “Our top priority, which we don’t disguise, is to preserve the peace, stability, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia.”161 This statement can 
be seen as pandering to those who believe that if the VMRO-DPMNE is removed from 
power these issues – sovereignty and territorial integrity – will be jeopardized. In the same 
statement Shcherbak goes on to say that: 
 we strictly adhere to the principle of mutual respect and equal rights in our relations 
with Macedonia, which a priori means respect for your country’s law, as well as 
the moves and decisions taken by its leaders and legitimate authorities…. we call 
on all political parties to… resolve the crisis in compliance with the existing 
constitutional legal framework of Macedonia… We should not forget that non-
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is a highly important 
principle of modern international law, and violating this principle is unacceptable 
and destructive. Macedonia should not be an exception in this respect. 
Over and over this trope of constitutionality and the law is expressed in official 
statements to grant more legitimacy to the government in power at the time. Other such 
statements include “respect for the moves and decisions taken by the legitimate authorities 
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and Government of Macedonia” and “We call on the country’s political forces to respect 
the will of the electorate and to act strictly within the constitutional framework to preclude 
any counterproductive external influence on the formation of the new cabinet.” Again here, 
there is a blending and intertwining of the frames. The frame emphasizing the rule of law 





This section will explore some of the similarities and differences between the 
reporting of the two international broadcasters. Overall, some of the same issues or topics 
which are discussed – such as ethnic minorities, the Special Prosecutor’s Office, 
corruption, and others – are framed in drastically different ways by Deutsche Welle and 
Sputnik News.  
As was noted earlier, DW actively reported on instances of ethnic unity during the 
Colorful Revolution protests. Individuals of various ethnic backgrounds (Macedonians, 
Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, etc.) were all coming together in a united way to protest 
for a new Macedonia. DW openly referenced how the term “colorful” was also a synonym 
for diversity – including ethnic diversity. On the other hand, Sputnik News pushed forward 
a frame of ethnic conflict in its reporting. Discussions about Albanians, Greater Albania, 
terrorists, criminals based in neighboring Kosovo, federalization, and partition featured 
prominently in SN’s English-language reporting. Sputnik News’ reporting in BCS went 
even further and discussed how Albanians were seeking to overthrow the constitutional 
order of Macedonia, how they are backed by the United States in these efforts, directly 
quoted individuals using ethnic slurs about Albanians, and reported on multiple protests 
led by Albanians. This sought to trigger negative reactions on the part of Macedonians and 
further the divide between the two groups in the country. These trigger words tie into 
locally salient narratives of purported Western support for Muslims (Albanians and 
Bosnians) in the Balkans during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo at the detriment of Slavic 
populations.  
However, both Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News negatively framed the ethnic 
Albanian Democratic Union for Integration party and its leader Ali Ahmeti. Deutsche 
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Welle tied Ahmeti to the VMRO-DPMNE government by noting how the DUI’s coalition 
with VMRO-DPMNE enabled both parties to capture the state and establish an autocratic 
regime. Sputnik News on the other hand avoided connecting DUI to the VMRO-DPMNE 
as this would delegitimize the government. Instead, it framed Ahmeti and the DUI within 
the ethnic conflict frame and portrayed them as anti-Macedonian, criminal, or supporters 
of a Greater Albania. For example, as was noted earlier, one article was exclusively about 
how human bones were found in the front yard of Ali Ahmeti. Another article discussed 
how Ahmeti’s deputy Artan Grubi chanted about the Kosovo Liberation Army in the run 
up to the elections. Despite both broadcasters framing Ahmeti and the DUI negatively – 
the way in which this was accomplished differed in order to further the specific frames 
each broadcaster utilized. 
The Special Prosecutor’s Office and their work, on the other hand, was framed in 
an opposite manner by the two broadcasters. Deutsche Welle heavily reported on the 
institution in both English and Macedonian for reasons that have been described earlier. 
This reporting was overwhelmingly favorable toward the institution – both as an important 
step in the EU accession process as well as in providing justice and accountability in 
Macedonia. However, Sputnik News rarely mentioned the institution in either English or 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. When it was mentioned it was tangentially related to the main 
topic of an article or it was delegitimized as a Western backed institution. The fact that 
references to the institution feature so little is odd even though President Ivanov’s 
pardoning of individuals under investigation by the Special Prosecutor is what sparked the 
protests is surprising. The reason for this is twofold. First, Sputnik News’ reporting and 
frames focused on the importance of President Ivanov’s pardons and his goal of ending 
political division in Macedonia through the pardons. Thus, reporting on the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office would work against furthering the law and order frame that gave 
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Ivanov legitimacy. Second, Sputnik News may have avoided negative reporting on the 
institution because it was in fact approved overwhelmingly by both the parliamentary 
majority comprised of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI as well as the opposition Social 
Democrats. Delegitimizing the Special Prosecutor’s Office would also put into question 
the decision by the VMRO-DPMNE government to formally approve the institution.  
The issue of corruption is another case where there was a drastic difference in 
framing. Deutsche Welle reported on corruption considerably throughout its coverage and 
presented it as a major problem or cause in all the frames. References to the VMRO-
DPMNE government’s abuse of power and how Macedonian citizens reacted to that were 
common for Deutsche Welle in both English and Macedonian. In English, this abuse of 
power was framed as detrimental to Macedonia’s accession into the EU whereas in 
Macedonian it was about how it impacted democracy and the everyday livelihood of the 
average citizen. Sputnik News, on the other hand, overall avoided the topic, but when 
corruption was covered it described the corruption of the opposition SDSM to make the 
negative image of the VMRO-DPMNE government relative. For example, when a news 
text would reference the fact that individuals from the VMRO-DPMNE were pardoned, 
Sputnik News would also highlight that Zoran Zaev, leader of the opposition, was also 
pardoned. Zoran Zaev was pardoned in 2008 by then SDSM President Branko Crvenkovski 
after he was charged on corruption charges related to his time as Mayor of Strumica. The 
SDSM protested the charges in 2008 claiming they were politically motivated. Regardless, 
Sputnik News was making the case that VMRO-DPMNE officials were under 
investigation, but so too are many from the opposition. This is a common practice in 
Macedonian news media where the misbehavior of one political party’s elected officials 
are compared to those of another party. In turn, politicians of all colors are presented as 
“all the same” and the discourse avoids conversations of their actual (and relative) crimes. 
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Another element which was framed differently was the discourse around the 
protests. Deutsche Welle was reporting on why the protesters were demonstrating, what 
their demands were, and what they hoped to achieve. Furthermore, the protesters were 
portrayed as peaceful and as legitimate in taking the actions they did. On the other hand, 
Sputnik News never mentioned the Colorful Revolution’s demands but instead focused on 
how the protesters’ actions were detrimental for Macedonia. DW was fulfilling its mission 
in reporting on the protesters calling for democracy as positive in that it aligned with the 
normative values of democracy and human rights which are fundamental to German 
foreign policy. Similarly, SN was in line with official Russian statements regarding the 
protests and thus portraying the government favorably while delegitimizing the protests. 
However, while Sputnik News framed the protests as negative, their reporting did not 
highlight the GDOM movement which supported the VMRO-DPMNE government. 
Interestingly, Deutsche Welle in both English and Macedonian offered more coverage of 
the pro-government GDOM movement than did Sputnik News. It may be that Sputnik 
News was following closely Russian official statements on the protests which focused on 
the legitimacy of the VMRO-DPMNE government rather than giving support to GDOM 
and as such they avoided discussing the counter-protest movement. Similarly, it may be 
that because none of the opinion pieces or commentaries by Macedonians for SN 
mentioned GDOM the outlet shied away from discussing it.  
Another major difference between the two broadcasters was the way in which they 
presented their online news. Deutsche Welle, in both English and Macedonian, listed the 
journalist(s), writer(s), or source(s) (if from another news service, etc.) as the author for 
almost all their articles. Sputnik News, on the other hand, in both English and 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, almost never listed any author for most of their news items. 
Only when a news texts was an opinion piece did they do so, but even then, in most cases 
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the opinion pieces and commentaries listed no author. While publishing news without an 
author is an unfortunate journalistic practice for much online news in Eastern Europe there 
usually is an author listed for opinion pieces and commentaries. Again, as noted earlier, 
the fact that there no authors listed may be an indication that Sputnik News did not want 
particular claims in the pieces to be attributable to specific individuals, but to the broader 
institution as a whole.  
Another difference was in the broadcasters’ commemorative news articles. For 
example, Deutsche Welle ran a piece in Macedonian marking the one-year anniversary of 
the anti-government protest and government crackdown which took place on May 5, 2015 
in the aftermath of the revelations about the VMRO-DPMNE government’s role in the 
cover-up of the murder of  a young man named Martin Neskovski. This was framed as a 
commemoration of that protest moment and how the protests in 2016 trace their roots from 
that particular event. This served as an intertextual link between DW’s news writing during 
the Colorful Revolution and prior protest moments in Macedonia. Sputnik News, on the 
other hand, in keeping with the ethnic conflict frame commemorated the one-year 
anniversary of the clash between an ethnic Albanian armed group and government forces 
in Kumanovo on May 9 and 10, 2015. Just as in the case of DW, Sputnik News framed this 
in a commemorative manner and discussed how nothing had changed since the incident, 
how no one had been tried, and how families were still mourning the loss of their loved 
ones. Both of these commemorative articles furthered respective frames by each 
broadcaster. DW was able to further its favorable coverage of the protests whereas SN kept 
up with the theme of ethnic conflict. 
Finally, it is clear that both Sputnik News and Deutsche Welle – as seen in the 
comparisons with official statements – generally reflected the official policy of their 
respective country toward the protests in Macedonia. Deutsche Welle’s reporting on the 
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protests gave them visibility, provided a platform for the voices of protesters, examined 
the problems facing the country, and offered legitimacy to the Special Prosecutor’s Office. 
This is in line with both Germany’s engagement with Macedonia during this time (through 
EU mediation efforts as well as the appointment of Haindl) as well as DW’s mission as an 
international broadcaster – to give voice to youth and promote democratic values. Sputnik 
News also toed the line with Russian official statements in coverage of the Colorful 
Revolution. SN focused on negatively portraying the protesters, discussing minority issues 
that could stir up ethnic conflict, and offered legitimacy to the VMRO-DPMNE 
government. However, rather than just getting those sentiments across in articles as DW 
did, it more often directly quoted statements by various Russian officials (Foreign Ministry 
spokeswoman Zakharova, Foreign Minister Lavrov, Ambassador Scherbak). Overall, these 
findings suggest that while international broadcasters may frames news events in favor of 
their respective country’s foreign policies, the way in which the events are framed and how 




Despite the global dominance of social media platforms as a major news source; 
international broadcasting is not going away anytime soon. In fact, countries such as China 
have begun to expand their international broadcasting efforts over the past decade.162 Even 
during the current coronavirus pandemic, international broadcasters such as the BBC are 
seeing their “highest ever global audience.”163 As information and communication 
technologies continue to expand and take on a greater role in human life, so too will 
government interventions within the information space. At present, international 
broadcasting is among the most prevalent forms of such intervention and both scholars and 
policymakers must continue to keep an eye on these developments.  
As this thesis has shown, international broadcasters such as Germany’s Deutsche 
Welle and Russia’s Sputnik News are instrumental in framing the news to further their 
respective country’s public diplomacy efforts and inform the global public of their 
positions on international events. In examining the reporting of these broadcasters on the 
2016 pro-democracy Colorful Revolution protests in Macedonia this research uncovered 
unique findings about how DW and SN frame the news. Overall, both broadcasters framed 
the protests in Macedonia in line with their respective country’s foreign policy stance 
toward the situation.  
Germany and DW viewed and framed the protests as part of a domestic crisis 
revolving around the rule of law and state of democracy in Macedonia. As such, through 
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the domestic crisis frame and rule of law frame in English and the divided country frame 
and rule of law frame in Macedonian, DW provided broadly favorable coverage of the 
protests, criticism of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE government, and support for the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office. Deutsche Welle also incorporated elements of its mission – reporting 
on youth and the economy in developing countries – into the presentation of the frames. 
Finally, Deutsche Welle provided limited space for opinion pieces and commentaries in 
both English and Macedonian reporting but did allow for more such news items in the 
Macedonian-language version. As such, the commentaries in Macedonian were more direct 
in favor of the protests and in their criticism of the government. 
Russia’s Sputnik News presented the protests in Macedonia as a crisis precipitated 
by foreign meddling and ethnic minorities to destabilize the country and overthrow the 
“constitutional” and “legitimate” government of VMRO-DPMNE. In this vein, Sputnik 
News in both English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian utilized a foreign meddling frame, an 
ethnic conflict and destabilization frame, and a law and order frame. These frames covered 
the protests in an unfavorable light and attempted to present the protesters as tied to the 
opposition and foreign interests working in favor of the ethnic Albanian minority in 
Macedonia. It gave more favorable and positive coverage of both Macedonian president 
Ivanov and other VMRO-DPMNE officials in the country. However, unlike DW it focused 
on officials and did not offer favorable coverage of the government’s counter-protest 
movement. Despite having the same three frames in both English and 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian – the ethnic conflict and regional destabilization frame featured 
more prominently in the local language edition. This is likely due to the salience of these 
issues in Macedonia and the broader Balkan region when compared to foreign meddling or 
law and order. Finally, in terms of the opinion pieces, Sputnik News heavily relied on such 
texts to further the frames and used them more frequently than Deutsche Welle. 
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Additionally, Sputnik News maintained anonymity in many of the opinion pieces in both 
English and BCS. No author was listed for the articles thus making their claims (often 
extreme) unattributable.  
These findings are unique in that both international broadcasters not only further 
presented their views and public diplomacy efforts through these frames, but in both 
English and the local languages were cognizant of the salience of certain issues. Deutsche 
Welle effectively grabbed onto the fact that the Special Prosecutor’s Office and concerns 
about the rule of law were a high priority for many protesters and international observers. 
Similarly, Sputnik News effectively caught on to the VMRO-DPMNE government’s law 
and order discourse and their supporters’ concerns around ethnic minority issues as well as 
purported foreign interference.  
The results of this research can serve to guide future scholarly work on framing, 
international broadcasting and public diplomacy, as well as Macedonia and the broader 
Balkan region. Further research in the field should use these findings and explore the other 
aspects of framing theory – frame production and framing effects. Scholars may conduct 
interviews with journalists and others within Deutsche Welle and Sputnik News to explore 
the internal process of the creation of the frames. Similarly, research on how these frames 
were understood by the audience (i.e. the effect of the frames) is another avenue for future 
research. Furthermore, despite the growth and interdisciplinary nature of the framing field 
– not much research has focused on framing by state-owned international broadcasters. 
This research should be expanded as it provides a unique avenue to explore how frames 
are created in news organizations that are also part of a state’s overall foreign policy efforts.  
This is also important for policymakers. The increasing policy discussions 
surrounding issues such as disinformation and the news media have overwhelmingly 
focused on the malign attempts of state-owned international broadcasters to push certain 
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narratives. However, not much discussion has taken place on how these institutions should 
continue to operate in the 21st century and if in fact they can be used to deter disinformation 
and uphold journalistic standards. Government agencies dealing with such institutions – 
from the U.S. Agency for Global Media to European institutions managing networks such 
as Euronews and Poland’s Belsat – must be aware of what role these institutions can play 
in framing the news. Ultimately, as with private media, they are part of the social 
construction of reality and can be effective tools for public diplomacy rather than 
pejoratively seen as propaganda weapons.  
Finally, research on protests and framing overwhelmingly explores these issues 
from a social movement perspective, but not from a media and communication studies 
angle. Exploring protests, media, and framing in this way could lead to further fruitful 
studies. Furthermore, regional case studies exploring news framing in Macedonia, the 
Balkans, and the broader region of Central and Eastern Europe are limited and should be 
deepened – particularly analyzing local news organizations. Cross regional case studies 
focusing on understudied regions such as the Balkans afford both scholars and 
policymakers new insights into the functioning of the news media. These are avenues for 
exciting new research  and should be taken advantage of as we seek to understand the 
impact of the news media on our daily lives. 
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